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This research sought to understand why people from different cultures respond in 
fundamentally different ways to their own ingroup transgressions. We predicted that 
in face cultures, where self-worth is defined by one’s reputation, ingroup 
transgressions would elicit vicarious shame and withdrawal tendencies, especially in 
public; in dignity cultures, however, where self-worth does not depend on reputation 
and justice is a focal concern, ingroup transgressions would elicit vicarious guilt and 
reparative behavior. In Study 1, participants responded to hypothetical ingroup 
transgressions. In Study 2, sorority and fraternity members recalled a time when a 
group member committed a wrongdoing. In Study 3, we simulated a real ingroup 
offense in the lab. We found partial support for our hypotheses in Study 1; face 
predicted distancing behavior, mediated by image-threat appraisals and shame, but 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Theoretical and Practical Importance 
In February of 2010, the world-renowned company Toyota was confronted 
with a failure of epic proportions. Due to widespread mechanical malfunctions that 
led to consumer injuries and deaths, the Japan-based automaker was forced to recall 
more than eight million vehicles. Americans were outraged when Toyota President 
Akio Toyoda failed to issue a public apology until more than two weeks after the 
original recall. Experts on Japanese culture speculated that the delay in apology was 
due to face concerns; that is, in Japanese culture, people do not wish to draw attention 
to failures in order to preserve the reputation of individuals or groups (Lim, 2010). 
Americans, accustomed to the United States’ corporate culture of timely apologies 
and fair compensation for injustices (Frantz & Bennigson, 2005; Lee et al., 2011), did 
not know what to make of Mr. Toyoda’s behavior. Did the absence of a prompt 
apology indicate that the automaker did not take responsibility for his company’s 
actions? Was he not interested in the safety and well-being of his international 
customers? Did he feel no guilt, shame or remorse on behalf of his company’s 
failures? 
 In a globalized world where people from different cultures must 
communicate, cooperate and solve problems on a daily basis, baffling situations like 
these are not all that uncommon. This example in particular illustrates the importance 




Even though Mr. Toyoda’s behavior may have been considered appropriate in Japan, 
his delayed apology induced frustration among Americans. Discrepancies in cultural 
norms and expectancies can lead to misunderstandings such as the one experienced 
by Mr. Toyoda and his American consumer base. People from one culture may see 
apologizing or offering reparations as the best way to make amends, whereas people 
from a different culture may prefer not to address the transgression at all and see 
withdrawing from the conflict as more appropriate than provoking a confrontation. If 
the offending party uses withdrawal as a strategy when the victim is expecting an 
apology, misunderstandings can ensue and give rise to large-scale intergroup conflict. 
Thus, a better understanding of how people from different cultures react to the 
wrongdoings of their ingroup members may prevent such cases of intercultural 
misunderstanding from taking place.  
 With instances like Mr. Toyoda’s controversial response to the Toyota failure, 
it is important to understand the process through which an event like an ingroup 
wrongdoing is translated into action through emotional affordances, and more 
generally, how a single event can lead to vastly different outcomes across cultures. 
Drawing on extant research, we argue that ingroup transgressions can evoke divergent 
appraisals, or judgments, about the situation due to different focal concerns in 
different cultures, or in other words, issues considered important by an individual or 
group (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). Focal concerns about justice, which we argue 
below are predominant in dignity cultures (Kim & Cohen, 2010; Leung, Cohen & Au, 
2011; Leung & Cohen, 2011; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009), may lead to appraisals 




preserving a positive group image, which we argue are predominant in face cultures 
(Ho, 1976; Kim & Cohen, 2010; Leung, Cohen & Au, 2011; Leung & Cohen, 2011), 
might lead to appraisals about implications for the ingroup’s reputation. These 
appraisals then lend themselves to certain emotional reactions like guilt and shame, 
respectively, which can be experienced vicariously on behalf of an ingroup member 
(Lickel et al., 2005). That is, a preoccupation with the injustice of the transgression 
leads to feelings of guilt, an emotion that has been associated with a focus on the 
wrongness of the behavior itself (i.e., “I did something bad”; Niedenthal, Tangney & 
Gavanski, 1994). Alternatively, a feeling that the transgression has cast a negative 
light on the group’s identity may induce shame, an emotion associated with a feeling 
of being inherently bad on account of the wrongdoing. (i.e., “I am a bad person”; 
Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 1994). In turn, these guilt and shame experiences 
motivate divergent behavioral responses such as reparation-oriented apologies 
(Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994) or reputation protecting strategies like 
withdrawal (Tangney & Dearing, 2002), respectively.  
 More generally, drawing on literature in cultural psychology, we expect that 
cultural models of self-worth influence how people react to ingroup wrongdoings and 
their subsequent appraisals, emotions and behavioral tendencies resulting in highly 
different reactions to the same ingroup transgression across cultures. There is already 
evidence to suggest that individuals from the United States define self-worth in terms 
of dignity, which is the notion that worth is created from within, should be afforded to 
everyone, and cannot be taken away by others (Kim, Cohen & Au, 2010; Leung & 




deserves, justice is a focal concern in dignity cultures. Accordingly, we propose that 
the justice concerns that are focal in dignity cultures will lead individuals to appraise 
ingroup wrongdoings with respect to concerns about the injustices inflicted upon the 
victim. Subsequently, these transgression-focused appraisals will afford the emotional 
experience of guilt, and encourage behavioral responses that can mend injustices like 
apology and reparation. 
In many East Asian cultures like Japan, however, worth is defined in terms of 
face, or how the self is seen through the eyes of others (Ho, 1976; Kim, Cohen & Au, 
2010; Leung & Cohen, 2011). Because the perspective of others is so important in 
face cultures, image protection is a focal concern. As such, we predict that the image 
concerns that are focal in face cultures will lead these individuals to respond to 
ingroup transgressions with identity-focused shame reactions. In turn, shame will set 
in motion image-protecting behavioral strategies like withdrawal or derogation of 
ingroup offenders (i.e., black sheep effect; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). Notably, as we 
will argue below, certain situational factors like the public or private nature of the 
transgression might moderate shame responses, given the extent to which public 
opinion defines self-worth in face cultures.  The public or private nature of the 
situation, however, is not expected to be as relevant in dignity cultures (c.f. Kim & 
Cohen, 2012).  
In sum, as in the Toyota example discussed above, we expect that even in 
identical situations, people from dignity and face cultures might appraise and react to 
events like ingroup transgressions quite differently. Due to such diametrically 




expectation of an apology when the other party engages in avoidance), intercultural 
misunderstanding is likely to surface when an ingroup’s response is incongruent with 
an outgroup victim’s expectations. Because intercultural misunderstanding can 
quickly spiral into intergroup conflict (Lickel et al., 2006; Stenstrom et al., 2008; 
Brown, Wohl & Exline, 2008; Gelfand et al., 2012), research on this topic is of 
central theoretical and also practical importance. 
Overview of This Research 
In what follows, we will first give a general overview of the appraisal and 
emotion literature to demonstrate that the sequence through which emotional 
reactions and behavior are produced is driven by what is focal in a particular culture. 
Next, we will integrate findings from the guilt and shame literatures to highlight 
certain appraisals and action tendencies that have been linked to emotions in response 
to an ingroup transgression. We will then discuss why cultural models of self-worth 
explain how the same transgression can lead to vastly different emotions and 
outcomes across cultures. Thereafter we will propose three studies to test the 
hypothesis that focal concerns of justice and image in dignity and face cultures will 
differentially predict vicarious guilt and shame responses to an ingroup transgression, 
respectively. Figure 1 provides a visual illustration of the theory being presented. 
Appraisal and Emotional Processes  
In their seminal Psychological Bulletin paper, Mesquita and Frijda (1992) 
proposed a process model of emotions to illustrate the ways in which variation can be 




appraisals, emotional reactions, and action tendencies, and this whole process is 
driven by focal concerns within the context of the event. We will provide a brief 
overview of the process model and go on to discuss how vicarious responses to 
ingroup transgressions can be mapped onto this structure, drawing from findings on 
guilt and shame and highlighting the relevance of justice and image as focal concerns, 
respectively. 
From Focal Concerns to Appraisals 
In the process model of emotions, some antecedent event must occur, which 
then becomes subject to interpretation (Scherer et al., 1986; Mesquita & Frijda, 
1992). The appraisal of an event involves evaluative processes concerning the 
implications of the situation for oneself or others (Smith & Lazarus, 1990; Mesquita 
& Ellsworth, 2001; Scherer, 2001), and different appraisals can arise across 
individuals and groups even following an identical event (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; 
Scherer, 1997; Zhang & Cross, 2011). For example, events leading to disgust tend to 
involve appraisals about immorality, and events leading to joy often result from 
appraisals about goal achievement (Wallbott & Scherer, 1988). This process is 
inherently linked to focal concerns, or in other words, issues that are considered 
salient or important within a particular sociocultural context (Lebra, 1983; Mesquita 
& Frijda, 1992; Scherer, 1997). Attention to these concerns will influence what 
appraisals are made about an event. For example, Japanese society emphasizes the 
importance of giri, which is the duty to fulfill obligations and protect one’s 
reputation. In contrast, a focal concern for American society is the protection of 




appraisals in response to identical conflict episodes. Using multidimensional scaling, 
Japanese categorized (i.e. appraised) conflicts in terms of the degree to which they 
reflected violations of duties and failure to maintain reputation whereas Americans 
categorized the identical conflicts in terms of how much they reflected violations to 
rights and infringements to autonomy (Gelfand et al., 2001). 
From Appraisals to Emotional Reactions 
 According to the process model of emotions (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992) 
appraisals afford the experience of specific emotions (Smith & Lazarus, 1990; 
Scherer, 2001; Roseman & Evdokas, 2004). Some emotions are associated with 
corresponding facial expressions or physiological responses, as well as direct 
subjective self-reports, and can be experienced at varying levels of intensity and 
duration (Ekman, Friesen & Ellsworth, 1972; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Scherer & 
Wallbott, 1994; Russell, 1994; Eid & Diener, 2001; Kitayama, Mesquita & Karasawa, 
2006; Matsumoto & Hwang, 2011).  For example, universally recognized facial 
expressions exist for happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, fear, disgust and contempt 
(Izard, 1971; Ekman, Friesen & Ellsworth, 1972; Ekman et al., 1987), and some 
people report physiological sensations alongside emotions such as change in body 
temperature, arousal, feelings in the stomach, and increased or decreased heartbeat 
(Scherer et al., 1986; Wallbot & Scherer, 1988).  However, the extent to which these 
reactions are manifested and reported depend on sociocultural constraints about their 
appropriateness and salience as indicators of emotional experience. For example, 




Ekman, 1989), and also report fewer physiological symptoms of emotions (Scherer et 
al., 1988). 
From Emotional Reactions to Action Tendencies 
Emotions exhibit a strong influence on decision-making processes and 
behavior (Isen & Shalker, 1982; Lickel, Schmader & Spanovic, 2007). Appraisals of 
events and subsequent emotional experiences can drive behavior directed toward 
sustaining or shifting away from an emotional state; for example, prosocial behavior 
has been linked to both the desire to maintain positive emotions as well as to reduce 
the experience of negative emotions (Isen & Levin, 1972; Clark & Isen, 1982; Batson 
et al, 1988; Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994; Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009). 
Thus, the experience of emotions involves a complex process of antecedent appraisals 
and behavioral outcomes, and it is important to understand why a single event might 
result in fundamentally distinct emotional and behavioral responses depending on 
differences in focal concerns.  
Although Mesquita and Frijda’s process model (1992) outlines a clear 
relationship between appraisals, emotions and behavior, this mechanistic approach is 
subject to debate as other models have emerged to challenge the notion that emotional 
processing occurs in such a straightforward, linear fashion. For instance, the 
psychological constructionist perspective describes emotional experience as core 
affect combined with conceptual knowledge about emotion (Barrett, Lindquist et al., 
2007; Barrett & Lindquist, 2008a; 2008b). In other words, an individual first has 
some discrete ‘emotional experience,’ which may be characterized by valenced and 




specific emotion, such as guilt or shame, as a result of preexisting knowledge or 
available information about what constitutes different categories of emotion. 
Categorization transforms the core affective state into an intentional state (Barrett & 
Lindquist, 2008a) and leads to appraisals about what caused the affective experience 
and what course of action to take next. This approach allows for cultural variation 
such that cultural differences in focal concerns could elicit qualitatively discrete 
conceptualizations of core affective states.  
We acknowledge that there are multiple perspectives from which we can 
approach the study of vicarious emotions, and we do not take a strong stance on one 
in particular. We use the process model (Mesquita & Frijda, 1991) in the present 
research merely as a heuristic for distinguishing between the appraisal, emotional and 
behavioral components of reactions to ingroup transgressions. We do not measure or 
analyze reactions to ingroup wrongdoings in a way that temporally defines the onset 
of appraisals, emotions and behavioral responses, but we see each of these responses 
as theoretically relevant to the understanding of ingroup wrongdoings. 
Responses to Ingroup Trangressions 
In the present research, our interest is in understanding how witnessing an 
ingroup wrongdoing affords such a process of appraisals, emotions and action 
tendencies, and how the outcomes can vary drastically due to differences in focal 
concerns. Research surrounding the trajectory through which a transgression leads to 
appraisals, emotions and action tendencies has emerged in the guilt and shame 
literature (Tangney et al., 1996; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2006). 




an important norm that reflects poorly on the self (Lewis, 1971), but involve distinct 
appraisal processes and behavioral responses. However, little is known about what 
focal concerns give rise to these appraisal and emotional processes in the first place. 
Moreover, accumulating evidence points to the notion that guilt and shame can also 
be experienced vicariously on behalf of an ingroup transgression (Doosje et al., 1998; 
Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003; Johns, Schmader & Lickel, 2005; Lickel et al., 2005; 
Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007). Although this link has yet to be explicitly drawn in 
the vicarious guilt and shame literature, we propose that in response to the same 
ingroup transgression, vicarious guilt is most likely to emerge in contexts where 
justice is a focal concern, whereas vicarious shame is more likely to be experienced 
when image is a focal concern. We will provide support for this argument in what 
follows. 
As mentioned previously, guilt involves appraisals focused on the 
transgression itself (i.e., “I did something wrong”). People who feel guilt are 
specifically preoccupied with the harm incurred by their transgression when it occurs 
in an interpersonal context. Thus, it stands to reason that appraisals leading to guilt 
are drawn from focal concerns about justice, or in other words, distress about the 
inequity between the transgressor and the victim that has come from the wrongdoing. 
In turn, the experience of guilt affords behaviors that attenuate the emotional state 
through repairing the wrongdoing, thus alleviating justice concerns. For example, 
guilt has been found to predict behavior such as apologies and reparative actions that 
restores justice between the offender and the victim (Baumeister, Stillwell & 




approach-oriented emotion (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Shiekh & Janoff-Bulman, 
2010). 
In contrast to guilt, shame involves appraisals about the implications a 
transgression has for beliefs about the self (i.e., “I am a bad person”; Niedenthal, 
Tangney & Gavanski, 1994). Shame is associated with internal, stable and 
uncontrollable attributions for failure, as opposed to merely feeling bad about the 
transgression at hand (Tracy & Robins, 2006). Thus, it could be reasoned that shame 
emerges from focal concerns about one’s general sense of self-worth. The experience 
of shame predicts a repertoire of behaviors quite distinct from those elicited by guilt. 
Shame is said to be an avoidance-based emotion (Shiekh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). 
Because it is more difficult to “fix” the problem when the problem is the self as 
opposed to the specific wrongdoing, people who experience shame are more likely to 
demonstrate avoidance and withdrawal behaviors (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
Recent work has extended theories of guilt and shame to involve situations 
when people experience these emotions by proxy of another person or group’s 
behavior. These third-party experiences of self-conscious emotions are called 
collective or vicarious1 guilt and shame. For example, some white Americans feel 
guilt for the injustices that took place against African-Americans during the times of 
slavery despite having had no role in what happened (Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003). 
According to Social Identity Theory, individuals define themselves according to their 
                                                
1 It is important to note that much of the present literature on the third-party experience of guilt and 
shame fails to  distinguish between the terms “vicarious” and “collective.” “Vicarious” implies that 
one person experiences an emotion on behalf of another, whereas “collective” suggests a group-level 
experience; that an entity consisting of multiple individuals shares a sense of guilt or shame. Much of 
the work on collective guilt and shame actually concerns situations that may be more appropriately 
labeled as vicarious. For the purpose of the present research, we will refer to the third-party experience 




group membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and a person may respond to the acts of 
other ingroup members as if it was their own individual experience. Indeed, a recent 
body of work has found evidence that individuals feel guilt or shame on behalf of the 
actions of other group members, ranging from close friends (Lickel et al., 2005; 
Schmader & Lickel, 2006) to members of their nationality (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; 
Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007; Leach, Iyer & Pederson, 2006). 
Research on vicarious guilt has revealed that individuals who feel guilt on 
behalf of an ingroup make appraisals similarly to those who experience guilt on a 
first-person level (Doosje et al., 1998). Vicariously guilty people are preoccupied 
with the transgression at hand as opposed to implications for their group’s identity, 
and are motivated to help restore the balance between the offender and the 
disadvantaged victim (Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003; Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007). 
Individuals who think about the offenses of their ingroup are likely to support 
reparatory actions toward the victim. For example, Brown and Cehajic (2008) found 
that guilt in Bosnian Serbs predicted attitudes in support of reparations for harm 
inflicted by their group in the 1992-1995 war. The effects of guilt were mediated by 
empathy toward the outgroup.   
More recently, vicarious shame has emerged as a topic in emotion research. 
Much like the first-person shame literature, vicarious shame is associated with 
appraisals about the fundamental nature of the self, with respect to group 
membership. Lickel et al. (2005) found that vicarious shame could be predicted by 
the extent to which a transgression was relevant to the shared social identity between 




degree to which an individual perceives a threat to his or her self-image (Lickel et al., 
2005; Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007). Such appraisals of threat to self-image predict 
motivation to distance oneself from the transgression, a reaction typically associated 
with shame on the first-person level (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). For example, when 
British participants were reminded about their country’s involvement in Iraq, shame-
based reactions were mediated by appraisals of image threat, and predicted action 
intentions to advocate withdrawal of troops (Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007). 
Vicarious shame can also lead to other distancing behaviors. Because of the threat an 
ingroup transgression can present to one’s social image, vicarious shame can result in 
the black sheep effect, which is the tendency to derogate an ingroup member or 
distance oneself from the group as the consequence of the violation of a group norm 
(Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988).  
 Although the literature has linked vicarious guilt and shame to appraisals of 
justice and image threats, respectively, little is known about why the same event 
might elicit distinctive types of appraisals and emotional experiences across different 
people and situations. For instance, why is it that Mr. Toyoda’s response to the 
Toyota failure was more indicative of shame than guilt? We expect that culture plays 
an important role in the trajectory of vicarious emotions that arise from an ingroup 
transgression. However, because no work thus far has addressed the role of culture in 
vicarious guilt and shame2, we have a limited understanding of how individuals from 
different cultures might react to a wrongdoing on behalf of a fellow ingroup member. 
                                                
2 Virtually all of vicarious guilt and shame research has used the English lexical descriptors “guilt” and 
“shame,” despite that some languages use many more (or fewer) words to describe these experiences 
(Bruegalmans & Poortinga, 2006; Li, Wang & Fischer, 2004). Furthermore, because this research has 
relied on North American samples, that which we know thus far about the appraisals associated with 




Given the special self-relevance of vicarious guilt and shame, we propose that 
cultural models of self-worth will have an important bearing on the focal concerns 
and appraisals associated with an ingroup transgression. Specifically, we look to 
dignity and face as cultural models of self-worth that are particularly relevant to the 
experience of vicarious guilt and shame. 
Dignity and Face Cultures 
Cultures have been known to vary in the way they define self-worth. In 
societies such as in the United States, there is a belief that self-worth is created from 
within, and that no one can take one’s sense of worth, or dignity, away from a person. 
Conversely, in some East Asian cultures, self-worth is defined by the perception of 
others. In these cultures, this public reputation, or one’s face, is the primary 
determinant of the worth one holds (Kim, Cohen & Au, 2010; Leung & Cohen, 
2011).  
Dignity and face cultures are characterized by beliefs about the self that are 
reinforced through social structures and internal or external systems of self-control. 
Dignity is rooted in the idea that individuals are born with equal worth and should 
live freely from the control of others (Ayers, 1984; Kim, Cohen & Au, 2010). These 
ideals lead to strong norms for positive tit-for-tat reciprocity (Leung & Cohen, 2011), 
which are reflected in laws protecting individuals from harm or infringement of rights 
by others. Fairness is a particularly strong tenet of dignity societies like the United 
States (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009). There is a common standard in dignity 
cultures that every individual should be afforded certain inalienable rights, no matter 




other people’s opinions. Related to the idea that worth comes from within is the 
notion that internal standards should guide behavior, rather than concern for what 
others think. Although individuals are guided by internal standards, these standards 
arise from societally shared beliefs that all individuals deserve to be treated equally. 
Thus, the primary goal in response to a transgression should be to “do what’s right” 
rather than “do what other people think I should do,” and “what’s right” usually 
constitutes making sure the cards are played fairly. In this sense, guilt is thought to be 
an effective internal self-control mechanism for guiding appropriate behavior and 
repairing wrongdoings (Kim, Cohen & Au, 2010). People who deny others fair 
treatment should feel guilty for their behavior. When an individual commits a 
transgression, they have the opportunity to restore their own dignity and resolve 
justice concerns by expressing remorse and repairing the equity between themselves 
and the victim.  
In contrast, focal points of concern for face cultures are maintaining harmony, 
reputation and hierarchy within society (Ho, 1976; Kim, Cohen & Au, 2010; Leung & 
Cohen, 2011). The emphasis on avoiding conflict as opposed to maintaining fairness 
is reinforced by the legal system. For example, when there is a car accident in Japan, 
responsibility is usually split at least 20/80, even if one driver was clearly at fault. 
This is thought to preserve harmony by not singling out one person to take the blame. 
Unlike dignity, the amount of face one has is relative to their position in the social 
hierarchy; higher status individuals have more face, and thus more face to lose. Face 
can be lost through overreaching on status claims or doing something that disrupts 




individual who has lost face. Therefore, maintaining a positive reputation among 
others is a key concern, perhaps more so than actually resolving the conflict at hand. 
Shame is thought to be a powerful regulator of behavior in face cultures (Kim, Cohen 
& Au, 2010); fear of a tarnished reputation motivates behavior that adheres to social 
standards. If one has behaved in a way that is shame-worthy, it is considered better to 
accept the judgment of others than to defy it. Because face as a determinant of self-
worth is something that is reached by social consensus, it is not within one’s own 
control to regain face through good behavior after face loss. Instead, it is more 
socially adaptive to withdraw from embarrassing situations rather than make active 
attempts to “fix” the problem in a way that draws attention, thus potentially disrupting 
harmony and causing further loss of face (Kim, Cohen & Au, 2010). When an 
embarrassing failure affects the whole group, it could even be beneficial to pretend 
the event did not happen in order to prevent the onset of shame.  
Indeed, preliminary evidence suggests that people from dignity and face 
cultures react differently to their own moral transgressions. In one study, Anglo-
Americans and Asian Americans were made to believe that they had committed either 
many or few moral transgressions, and were asked to think of these transgressions 
either in their own perspective or in the perspective of significant others (Kim & 
Cohen, Study 1, 2010). After the experiment, participants were offered the choice of a 
handwipe or a pencil as gift. The handwipe choice has been used in past research as 
an implicit measure of moral cleansing after committing a transgression (Zhong and 
Liljenquist, 2006). For Anglo-Americans, people who thought they had committed 




believed that more transgressions required greater need for cleansing. However, for 
Asian-American participants, others’ perceptions played a greater role in the 
handwipe choice than number of transgressions alone. When made to think the 
number of transgressions were few in the eyes of significant others, Asian-Americans 
rarely chose the handwipe; when the number was high, however, the handwipe was 
chosen much more often. Importantly, this effect did not hold when others’ opinions 
were not invoked. These results suggest that people from face cultures, as opposed to 
dignity cultures, experience greater emotional upheaval when they believe that others 
think badly of them. 
Drawing upon these findings, we might suppose that dignity and face as 
models of self-worth should make certain concerns become more or less salient when 
an ingroup member commits a wrongdoing, evoking corresponding appraisal, 
emotional and behavioral processes. Even though people from both dignity and face 
cultures might be affected by witnessing an ingroup wrongdoing, different appraisals 
may come out of the situation. People from dignity cultures may be more preoccupied 
with the distribution of fairness, whereas people from face cultures may be more 
concerned with how the event bears upon their reputation. These appraisal processes 
have downstream implications for emotions and action, such that when witnessing an 
identical transgression, dignity cultures may be motivated by guilt to enact reparative-
oriented behavior, and face cultures driven by shame to display avoidance tendencies. 
Moreover, given that the role of others’ judgments in definitions of self-worth 
varies so significantly between face and dignity cultures (Kim & Cohen, 2010; Kim, 




moderator of how vicarious guilt and shame are experienced. Because dignity 
cultures should be theoretically most concerned with correcting injustices, it should 
not matter whether or not a transgression occurred in public or private. For face 
cultures, however, the public nature of the wrongdoing is more likely to impact 
appraisals of the situation. Face loss through a wrongdoing is contingent upon the 
assumption that others will be aware of your behavior. Therefore, appraisals of image 
threat should be particularly salient when it is apparent that public judgment is 
possible. Transgressions might be less of a concern when the situation is not made 
public, as reflected in the finding from the aforementioned study that Asian 
Americans chose the handwipe less frequently when not invoking the perspective of 
others (Kim & Cohen, 2010). However, most of the vicarious guilt and shame 
literature has involved situations that are inherently public, such as national 
transgressions (e.g., Brown & Cehajic, 2008). Therefore, it is difficult to tease apart 
reputational concerns from preoccupation with the ingroup violation. Thus, we seek 
to determine how public and private context moderates cultural influences on 
emotional reactions to vicarious transgressions. 
Naturally, there is room for within-culture variation in responses to ingroup 
transgressions. Not all Asian Americans endorse face as a model of self-worth, 
particularly those who have spent their whole lives growing up in a dignity culture 
like the United States. Likewise, not all Americans endorse the tenets of dignity to the 
same extent. Accordingly, we measure face and dignity and examine endorsement of 
these concepts as our main predictors in the following studies. We also acknowledge 




or less accessible, a point to which we return in the discussion.  A transgression that is 
fundamentally about justice is likely to activate justice concerns across the board, 
whereas a transgression that is more relational will make image concerns more 
salient. We attempt to explore a range of situations and conditional factors in what 
follows. 
Hypotheses 
The present research adds to the emotional processing, vicarious guilt and 
shame and cultural models of self-worth literatures by providing a more nuanced 
understanding of the process through which ingroup transgressions translate to action 
through appraisals and emotional affordances, and how this process can vary due to 
culturally specific focal concerns. Based on the integration of these literatures, we 
arrive at the following hypotheses, which we empirically test with respect to 
hypothetical, past and laboratory-controlled transgressions: 
Hypothesis 1.a. Appraisals: In response to an ingroup transgression, 
endorsement of face as a model of self-worth will predict appraisals of threat 
to one’s image, especially in public situations.  
Hypothesis 1.b. Appraisals: In response to an ingroup transgression, 
endorsement of dignity as a model of self-worth will predict appraisals of 
threats to justice, and will not vary as a function of public or private context.  
Hypothesis 2.a. Emotional Reactions:  In response to an ingroup 
transgression, endorsement of face as a model of self-worth will predict the 




Hypothesis 2.b. Emotional Reactions: In response to an ingroup transgression, 
endorsement of dignity as a model of self-worth will predict the emotional 
experience of vicarious guilt, and will not vary as a function of public or 
private context.  
Hypothesis 3.a. Behavioral Responses: In response to an ingroup 
transgression, endorsement of face as a model of self-worth will predict 
withdrawal or distancing behavioral intentions, especially in public situations.  
Hypothesis 3.b. Behavioral Responses: In response to an ingroup 
transgression, endorsement of dignity as a model of self-worth will predict reparation-
oriented behavioral intentions, and will not vary as a function of public or private 
context. Hypothesis 4. Moderated Mediation: The trend for face to predict withdrawal 
and distancing will be mediated by appraisals of threats to one’s image and the 
vicarious experience of shame, especially in public situations. The trend for dignity to 
predict reparation-oriented behavior will be mediated by appraisals of threats to 
justice and the vicarious experience of guilt. 
General Overview 
In three studies, we investigate the hypothesis that people from dignity and 
face cultures differentially experience guilt and shame on behalf of an ingroup 
member’s transgression on account of focal concerns for justice and image, 
respectively. Specifically, we examine cultural differences in the appraisals, 
emotional reactions, and action tendencies in response to an ingroup transgression. 
Study 1 used pre-tested vignettes to assess cultural differences in appraisals, 




Because hypothetical behavior is not a reliable approximation of actual behavior 
(Baumeister, Vohs & Funder, 2007), Study 2 used mindset priming to examine 
reactions to a real-life ingroup member’s wrongdoing in dignity and face cultures. 
Although this method has high external validity, it is important to understand how a 
single event can lead to different outcomes across cultures (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). 
Thus, Study 3 investigated real behavior in response to an ingroup member’s 
transgression in a laboratory game.  
We used a measure to directly assess endorsement of dignity and face as 
models of self-worth. Because participants from the United States might 
overwhelmingly endorse dignity as a model of self-worth, we decided to sample from 
cultural backgrounds known to endorse dignity or face in order to increase variability 
in responses. Previous work gives support to the notion that Americans subscribe to 
dignity as a model of self-worth, and East Asian countries are more concerned with 
face (Ho, 1976; Kim, Cohen & Au, 2010; Kim & Cohen, 2011). Based on research 
that East Asian Americans share many cultural similarities with East Asians (Kim & 
Cohen, 2010), we sampled from University of Maryland undergraduate students who 
come from European American and East Asian backgrounds to represent dignity and 
face cultures. Our criteria for what specific ethnicities constituted dignity and face 
cultures were derived from the literature (c.f. Ting-Toomey et al., 2001). China, 
Korea and Japan are countries that are thought to be high on face, so we included 
participants whose family originated from these countries or countries that share 




Participants who were born in the United States and had family of Western European 




Chapter 2: Study 1 
 
 
Participants, Design and Procedure 
Participants were 106 students at the University of Maryland (70 female, 35 
male, 1 unknown; mean age = 19.9). Seven participants were removed from analyses 
because they did not clearly belong to a dignity or face culture (e.g. Eastern European 
or mixed ethnicity), or they failed to follow instructions properly3. Therefore, our 
final sample consisted of 99 participants (67 female, 31 male, 1 unknown; mean age = 
19.92). Fifty-one of these participants came from a European American background, 
and 48 came from an East Asian background. We allowed people to participate online 
or in the lab and all responded to an online survey. Seventy-three participants 
completed the study in the lab, and 26 participants completed the study online. All 
participants were offered $5 in compensation for the 30-minute study. 
Lab participants read and signed a consent form detailing the purpose of the 
study prior to participation. For online participants, the consent was obtained 
electronically. Online participants also read a statement with tips to avoid becoming 
distracted while participating in the study. Because the survey platform was internet-
based, the rest of the procedure was identical for both lab and online participants. 
First, participants completed the Dignity and Face Scale. Next, participants were 
asked to list the first name of a friend. Then, participants were presented with two 
                                                
3 Participants were asked to provide a friend’s first name, which was inserted into hypothetical ingroup 
wrongdoing scenarios. Participants who did not list a friend’s name did not read the scenarios as 




pre-tested scenarios in which their friend performed a wrongdoing that affected 
others. Scenarios were manipulated between-subjects to reflect that the wrongdoing 
took place in public or private. Thus, participants either saw two public situations or 
two private situations. Condition was randomly assigned by the survey platform, and 
scenario order was counterbalanced for each participant. After reading each scenario, 
participants were asked to respond to the transgression in terms of appraisals, 
emotional reactions, and hypothetical behavioral intentions, as well as complete 
additional control and demographic measures. Upon completing the study, all 
participants were debriefed and thanked. Lab participants were paid immediately, and 
online participants made an appointment to pick up their payment in person. 
Stimuli 
Hypothetical Scenarios 
We developed hypothetical scenarios to tap into different types of 
transgressions that occur in daily life, as per previous work on interpersonal offenses 
(Gonzales, Manning & Haugen, 1992). We administered two hypothetical scenarios. 
Scenario 1 was: “Imagine that [friend’s name] picked you up from your apartment 
complex. When backing out of a parking space, [friend’s name] hit a parked car in 
your lot and left noticeable damage. [Friend’s name] said “Oops!” and continued to 
drive out of the parking lot without leaving a note on the car that was hit.” Scenario 2 
was: “Imagine that you live in a dorm on campus with your friend [friend’s name]. 
There is a student on another hall who is somewhat quiet and withdrawn. You 
hear [friend’s name] make some nasty, hurtful comments about this student that are 




We performed a repeated-measures ANOVA in order to ascertain any 
potential differences in responding between the scenarios. They were not found to 
differ in perceived severity (t(98) = .57; n.s.). 
Public/Private Manipulation 
For half of the participants, it was made clear that other people were aware of 
the ingroup wrongdoing. For the other half of the participants, it was made clear that 
the wrongdoing was not known about publicly. The public and private versions of the 
scenarios were also subject to pilot testing with our focus group. The private version 
of the hit-and-run scenario ended with “The parking lot was empty when this 
happened,” and the public version ended with “There were several other people in the 
parking lot who saw this happen.” The private version of the gossiping scenario 
ended with “When the student finally hears the rumors, most people don’t remember 
who actually started them,” and the public version ended with “When the student 
finally hears the rumors, most people in the dorm know that [friend’s name] started 
them.” See Appendix A for the complete list of scenarios and manipulations. 
Measures 
Dignity and face. We used the newly developed 11-item Dignity and Face 
Scale, which assesses the extent to which individuals identify with these cultural 
models of self-worth on a five-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all, 5 = Very much). 
Sample items for dignity include “All human beings should be treated with the same 
respect, regardless of their social status.” Sample items for face include “What others 




is sometimes framed at the descriptive norms level (i.e. “What do most Americans 
think?”), we framed the scale at the individual level because most of our East Asian 
sample was assumed to have grown up in the United States. We conducted Principal 
Axis Factor analysis on the scale with a direct oblimin rotation to allow for 
correlation between factors. Based on the factor loadings and substantive 
considerations about the relevance of certain items to the underlying constructs, we 
accepted a two-factor solution for the scale. Reliability was acceptable but not 
optimal, especially for the dignity subscale (dignity, ! = .62; face, ! = .73). See Table 
1 for factor loadings and Appendix B for the complete scale. 
Appraisals. We created a 12-item scale based on factors known to be relevant 
to the experience of self-conscious emotions, modifying items from Lickel and 
colleagues’ (2005) previous vicarious emotion research and Gelfand and colleagues’ 
(2001) work on conflict episodes. Our items specifically focused on image and justice 
based concerns. Image based concerns included items assessing the extent to which 
participants perceived a threat to their social identity or reputation as a consequence 
of their ingroup’s behavior. A sample item for image appraisals is “What happened 
was a threat to my group’s image/reputation.” Justice based concerns included items 
about unequal distribution of fairness and sympathy toward the victim. A sample item 
for justice appraisals is “What happened was a violation of fairness.” All items were 
pre-tested in advance with a group of East Asian and European American students. 
Items that were hard to understand or irrelevant were revised for the final version of 




In order to explore the structure of the new scale, we conducted Principal Axis 
Factoring (PAF) analyses on the 12-items with a direct oblimin rotation for each of 
the scenarios. PAF is a technique that allows shared variance among items, and direct 
oblimin rotation is used when factors may be related. This was an appropriate 
technique for our scale, as image and justice concerns should not be mutually 
exclusive. Our Kaiser’s criterion was set for Eigen-values over one.   
Taking into account standards for factor correlation and cross-loadings, we 
deemed a two-factor solution acceptable, with the hypothesized Justice and Image 
dimensions. We decided to remove one Image item, “What happened would 
compromise harmony within my group,” from the analyses because it was cross-
loading on the justice dimension. Therefore, we were left with six items in the justice 
subscale (! = .83) and five items in the image subscale (! = .86). See Table 2 for 
factor loadings and Appendix C for the complete measure. 
Emotional reactions. In line with past research (Leach et al., 2006; Lickel et 
al., 2005; Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007) we measured vicarious emotions using 
indices for guilt and shame. Guilt consisted of three items (guilty, remorseful, 
regretful; ! = .85), and shame consisted of five items (ashamed, disgraced, 
humiliated, embarrassed, shamefaced; ! = .93). Confirmatory factor analysis has 
demonstrated that these two factors are well defined by their items (Iyer, Schmader & 
Lickel, 2007). Emotion items were evaluated on a five-point Likert scale (1 = Not at 
all, 5 = Very much). See Appendix D for the complete measure. 
Behavioral intentions. Drawing from past research on behavioral intentions 




questions regarding how they wanted to behave in response to the wrongdoing they 
reported. The 12-item scale consisted of two main factors, reparative-oriented and 
avoidance-oriented behavior. Individual items assessed how much the participant 
wanted to apologize to the victim (e.g., “I wanted to apologize for what happened”), 
offer reparations (e.g., “I wanted to reach out toward the victim(s)”), withdraw (e.g., 
“I wanted to disappear from the situation”), or distance himself or herself from the 
offender (e.g., “I wanted to distance myself from the group member who caused the 
event”). These items were pre-tested in advance with a group of East Asian and 
European American students. Items that were hard to understand or irrelevant were 
revised. 
As with the appraisal measures, we conducted factor analyses to examine the 
structure of the behavioral intentions scale for the scenarios. Once again, we used 
Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) with direct oblimin rotation and Eigen-values held to 
one. Based on the PAF solution, we arrived at three dimensions: the Reparative 
Behavior factor (e.g., “I would want my friend to apologize to the victim,” ! = .85) 
consisted of six items, the Withdrawal Behavior factor (e.g., “I would want to hide,” 
! = .83) consisted of four items, and the Distancing Behavior factor (e.g., “I would 
want to distance myself from the group member who caused the event,” ! = .89) 
consisted of two items. Items were evaluated on a six-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly 
disagree, 6, = Strongly agree). Please see Table 3 for the factor loadings and 
Appendix E for the complete measure. 
Additional measures. We included several potential control variables, such as 




Self Circle Task (Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992; see Appendix G) as a measure of 
closeness with the friend whose name was used in the hypothetical scenario. Because 
these measures were not correlated with our predictors, they were not included in 
subsequent analyses. Finally, we asked participants some demographic questions 
about their age, gender and ethnicity (see Appendix H). 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for all study variables can be found in 
Table 4. First, we performed a manipulation check to ensure that participants had 
interpreted the public/private manipulation as intended. Next, we looked for 
differences in dignity and face in the East Asian and European American sample. We 
then conducted hierarchical regression analyses by regressing appraisals, emotions 
and behavioral intentions on dignity, face, condition and the two interaction terms. 
Manipulation Check 
After reading each scenario, participants were asked whether the event 
occurred in public or private. There was a tendency for many individuals in the 
private condition to categorize the situation as public (Scenario 1 n = 30, Scenario 2 n 
= 39), presumably because few situations involving another person can truly be 
considered private. However, participants were also asked how many people seemed 
to observe the incident and how easy it would be for other people to find out what 
happened. These items revealed that the public condition elicited greater perceptions 
of observation than the private condition. Collapsed across both scenarios, 




than participants in the private condition (M = 3.71 and M = 2.62, respectively; t(97) 
= 7.43, p < .001) and also thought that it would be easier for others to find out about 
the incident (M = 3.02 and M = 2.35, respectively; t(97) = 5.57, p < .001). 
Dignity and Face 
As expected, East Asians endorsed the concept of face more strongly than 
European Americans (M = 3.51, SD = .69 and M = 3.27, SD = .53, respectively; t(97) 
= 2.00, p < .05). However, the two samples did not differ on dignity scores (t(97) = 
.835, n.s.). This is to be somewhat expected as more than half of the participants in 
the East Asian sample were born in the United States, and only two had lived in the 
US for less than five years. Therefore, all participants were subject to some degree of 
American socialization and may have internalized dignity values. 
Appraisals 
We conducted hierarchical regression analyses to examine the predictive 
effect of dignity and face on justice- and image-based appraisals, moderated by the 
public/private condition. In the first step we entered mean-centered dignity and face 
scores and condition. Condition was effect-coded such that private = -1 and public = 
1 to increase interpretability of the regression coefficients. In the second step we 
entered two interaction terms that were created by multiplying the effect-coded 
condition term once with each the mean-centered dignity and face scores. 
Hypothesis 1.a predicted that face would be related to appraisals of threat to 
one’s image, especially in public situations. For image-threat appraisals, there were 




5). Higher face scores were associated with appraisals of a threat to one’s image (! = 
.33, p < .001), and perception of image-threat was also greater in the public condition 
(! = .34, p < .001). These main effects were qualified by a Condition x Face 
interaction in the full model (R2" = .033; ! = .19, p < .05; see Figure 2), which 
revealed that face predicted image-threat appraisals in public (! = .83, p < .001) but 
not in private (! = .28, n.s.). Thus, we found support for Hypothesis 1.a.  
Hypothesis 1.b predicted that dignity would be related to appraisals of a 
justice infraction. There were not effects for dignity on appraisals, however. 
Moreover, unexpectedly, face marginally predicted justice appraisals in the first step 
of the model (! = .18, p = .08). This effect was qualified by a two-way Condition x 
Face interaction in the full model (R2" = .074; ! = .28, p < .01; see Table 6), which 
revealed that the relationship between face and justice appraisals was particularly 
strong in the public condition (! = .64, p = .001) but not in private (! = -.04, n.s.). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1.b was not supported. 
Emotions 
We conducted hierarchical regression analyses to examine the effect of 
dignity and face on guilt and shame, moderated by the public/private condition. In the 
first step we entered mean-centered dignity and face scores and condition. Condition 
was effect-coded such that private = -1 and public = 1 to increase interpretability of 
the regression coefficients. In the second step we entered two interaction terms that 
were created by multiplying the effect-coded condition term once with both the mean-




Hypothesis 2.a predicted that face would be associated with feelings of shame, 
especially when the situation was public. Indeed, we found a main effect for face in 
the first step of the model, such that face was associated with greater appraisals of 
image threat (! = .27, p < .001). This main effect was qualified by a two-way 
interaction for Condition x Face in the full model (! = .25, p < .05; see Table 7 and 
Figure 3). Higher face scores were associated with increased shame, and were 
amplified in the public condition (! = .87, p < .001) as compared to the private 
condition (! = .14, n.s.). Thus, we found support for Hypothesis 2.a. 
Hypothesis 2.b predicted that dignity would be associated with feelings of 
guilt. Instead, only face was a significant predictor of guilt in the first step of the 
model, such that higher face scores were associated with increased feelings of guilt (! 
= .24, p < .05; see Table 8). Thus, Hypothesis 2.b was not supported. 
Behavioral Intentions 
We conducted hierarchical regression analyses to examine the predictive 
effect of dignity and face on reparative, avoidant and distancing behavioral intentions, 
moderated by the public/private condition. In the first step we entered mean-centered 
dignity and face scores and condition. Condition was effect-coded such that private = 
-1 and public = 1 to increase interpretability of the regression coefficients. In the 
second step we entered two interaction terms that were created by multiplying the 
effect-coded condition term once with both the mean-centered dignity and face 
scores.  
Hypothesis 3.a predicted that face would be associated with the desire to 




the situation was public. We found two main effects in the first step of the model. 
Overall, participants in the private condition actually wanted to distance themselves 
from their friend more than participants in the public condition (! = -.24, p < .05). 
There was also a marginal trend for dignity to predict the desire to distance oneself 
from the ingroup wrongdoer (! = -.20, p = .053). These main effects were qualified 
by a marginal two-way interaction for Condition x Face (R2" = .06; ! = .18, p = .075; 
see Table 9 and Figure 4), such that face predicted intentions to distance in public (! 
= .46, p = .09), but not in private (! = -.15, n.s.). Thus, we found partial support for 
Hypothesis 3.a.  
Hypothesis 3.a also predicted that face would be associated with the desire to 
withdraw after an ingroup wrongdoing, particularly when the situation was public. 
There was a significant two-way interaction for Condition x Face (R2" = .07; ! = .26, 
p < .05; see Table 10 and Figure 5), such that face predicted intentions to withdraw, 
but only in public (! = .65, p < .05) as compared to in private (! = -.34, n.s.). Thus, 
we found support for Hypothesis 3.a. 
Hypothesis 3.b predicted that dignity would be associated with the desire to 
repair the situation after an ingroup wrongdoing. There was no main effect for 
dignity, but there was a two-way interaction for Condition x Dignity (R2" = .05; ! = 
.22, p < .05; see Table 11) such that dignity actually slightly negatively predicted 
reparative intentions in private (! = -.41, p = .09) but not in public (! = .27, n.s.). 





Hypothesis 4 predicted that face would predict distancing tendencies, 
mediated by appraisals of image threat and shame, especially in public situations. We 
found partial to full support for Hypotheses 1.a, 2.a and 3.a through our hierarchical 
multiple regression analyses. We did not find support for Hypotheses 1.b, 2.b or 3.b. 
Thus, we set out to test our moderated mediation hypothesis only for the process 
model involving face. We conducted these analyses for both distancing and 
withdrawal appraisals. 
Moderated mediation focuses on the degree to which an indirect effect of 
some independent variable X on Y through mediator M depends on some moderator 
M (Hayes, 2012). We followed path analytic procedures for moderated mediation 
(Preacher, Rucker & Hayes, 2007; Hayes, 2012) with bootstrapping to test 
conditional indirect effects in the model. This is recommended over significance 
testing, as significance tests do not respect the non-normality of the sampling 
distribution of the indirect effect (Hayes, 2012). We entered face as the independent 
variable (X), condition as the moderator (W), and distancing/withdrawal as the 
dependent variables in each analysis (Y), with image-threat appraisals and shame as 
mediators (M1 and M2, respectively). Because appraisal and emotion measures were 
administered in such close temporal proximity, we entered these terms as mediators 
operating in parallel rather than serially (e.g. appraisals leading to emotions). Face, 
image-threat appraisals and shame were centered prior to analysis, and condition was 




Distancing. The analyses produced a 95% confidence interval based on 5000 
bootstrap samples for the conditional indirect effect of face on distancing at both 
values of the moderator (-1 = private, 1 = public). When the confidence intervals do 
not contain zero, the effect is considered significant. We found a conditional indirect 
effect of face on distancing through image-threat appraisals (CI95 = .020, .53) and 
shame (CI95 = .11, .70) when the transgression occurred in public. Confidence 
intervals for the private condition contained zero for both image-threat appraisals and 
shame. We then looked for an indirect effect of the highest-order Condition x Face 
interaction (irrespective of values of the moderator) on distancing through image-
threat appraisals and shame. We found indirect effects for both image-threat 
appraisals (CI95 = .00080, .24) and shame (CI95 =  .028, .36). Thus, we found support 
for Hypothesis 4. Please see Table 12 for the full moderated mediation results. 
Withdrawal. We performed the analyses again for withdrawal behavior. The 
analyses produced a 95% confidence interval based on 5000 bootstrap samples for the 
conditional indirect effect of face on withdrawal at both values of the moderator (-1 = 
private, 1 = public). We found a conditional indirect effect of face on distancing 
through shame (CI95 = .23, .96) and but not image-threat appraisals (CI95 = -.031, .53) 
when the transgression occurred in public. Confidence intervals for the private 
condition contained zero for both image-threat appraisals and shame. We then looked 
for an indirect effect of the highest-order Condition x Face interaction (irrespective of 
values of the moderator) on withdrawal through image-threat appraisals and shame. 




(CI95 = -.0070, .24). Thus, we found partial support for Hypothesis 4. Please see 
Table 13 for the full moderated mediation results. 
Discussion 
In Study 1, we found support for the hypothesis that face predicts appraisals of 
image threat, feelings of shame, and both intentions to withdraw from the situation 
and distance oneself from the offender in response to an ingroup transgression, 
especially in public. Moreover, our moderated mediation analyses provided partial 
support for the hypothesis that image-threat appraisals and shame mediate the 
relationship between face and behavioral outcomes in public situations. These 
findings provide insight as to why individuals who endorse face as a model of self-
worth might see withdrawal and distancing as an appropriate image-maintenance 
strategy.   
 We found little support for the hypothesis that dignity predicts appraisals of 
justice threat, feelings of guilt, and reparative behavioral intentions. Dignity actually 
negatively predicted reparative intentions in private. However, we also found that 
dignity negatively predicted the tendency to distance oneself from an ingroup 
wrongdoer. It may be that because the norms to apologize are so strong in American 
culture, there was a ceiling effect such that dignity scores had no additional predictive 
power.  
It is worth noting that face also predicted justice appraisals and guilt, 
including an interaction with the public condition for justice appraisals. It could be 
that people who are particularly concerned with reputation and preserving ingroup 




environment, especially when they occur in public. It is not particularly surprising 
that face also predicts guilt, since the literature reflects a historic struggle to 
disentangle these emotions.  
 Having found partial support for our theory in Study 1 using concrete 
hypothetical scenarios, we move on to test our hypotheses in a setting with higher 




Chapter 3: Study 2 
 
Participants, Design, and Procedure 
Participants were 130 undergraduate students (96 female, 35 male, 1 
unknown; mean age = 20) at the University of Maryland who belonged to sororities 
and fraternities. We chose sororities and fraternities because many students belong to 
these organizations and thus we could have better control over the type of group 
referenced in response to the mindset prime. Participants were offered $5 each for 
participating in an online survey, and the Office of Fraternity and Sorority Life also 
offered campus service credits to organizations that participated in the study. Of the 
six organizations sampled, two sororities and one fraternity considered themselves 
Asian Interest Groups. Of the participants, 65 came from a European American 
background, 44 came from an East Asian background, and the rest belonged to a 
different ethnic background. Only European American and East Asian participants 
were included in the analyses. We had to remove an additional 30 participants from 
analyses because they did not complete the prime instructions as intended4. We were 
then left with 79 participants (57 female, 22 male; mean age = 20.1). Of these 
participants, 51 came from a European American background and 28 came from an 
East Asian background. 
Study 2 used a mindset priming method (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen & Steller, 
1990; Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) to evoke memories of a time when a member of 
                                                
4 This included many participants who wrote that they had not witnessed an ingroup transgression in 




their sorority or fraternity committed a transgression that harmed someone outside of 
the group.  All participants completed the survey online, and were given instructions 
to avoid distraction during the study. All participants provided consent before 
beginning the study. First, participants completed the Dignity and Face Scale. Then, 
they were asked to recall and write about a time when they witnessed a person they 
knew commit a wrongdoing that harmed someone else. Following the recall, 
participants answered questions about the transgression including the public/private 
nature of the event, appraisals associated with the transgression (e.g., image threat, 
justice threat), and emotional reactions (e.g., shame, guilt), and behavioral responses 
(e.g., apologizing, withdrawing). Finally, participants completed additional 
demographic questions. At the end of the study, participants were thanked and 
debriefed. Participants were paid later at a chapter meeting. 
Stimuli 
Recall Instrument 
We presented participants with a prompt asking them to write about a time 
they witnessed a member of their group do something that harmed others. The exact 
wording of the prime was: “For the next 5 minutes, please write about a time when 
you witnessed (or heard about) a member of [organization name] do something that 
somehow harmed or negatively affected others who did not belong to your group. 
Describe what happened. Who did what? How did you feel? Did you do something, 
or want to do something?” The prompt was piloted in advance with East Asian and 




would improve the comprehension of the prime. See Appendix I for the recall prompt 
instructions. 
Measures 
Dignity and face.  We used the same 11-item Dignity and Face Scale as used 
in Study 1. This scale was also framed at the individual level, and we included the 5-
item dignity (! = .50) and 6-item face (! = .70) subscales in our analyses. 
Public/private context. In order to determine how often participants in dignity 
and face cultures reported ingroup transgressions that were public or private in nature, 
we asked participants to indicate whether the event occurred in public or in private. 
Participants were also asked how many people observed the incident, and how easily 
others could have found out about the event. 
Appraisals. Participants were asked to complete the same appraisal measures 
as in Study 1 about image and justice based concerns, modified to reflect a past event 
rather than a hypothetical scenario. Based on our analyses of the scale in Study 1, we 
broke down the items into the justice- and image-based appraisal subscales for 
analyses (! = .86 and ! = .82, respectively). 
Emotional reactions. Participants completed the same guilt and shame indices 
as used in Study 1, broken down into guilt and shame subscales (! = .79 and ! = .92, 
respectively). 
 Behavioral intentions. Participants completed the same behavioral intention 
items as in Study 1, including the approach, withdrawal, and distancing subscales (! 




Additional measures. We included several potential control variables, such as 
perceived severity of the transgression, participants’ status in the group (i.e., pledge 
or brother/sister) and how many semesters they belonged to the group. Because these 
variables were not found to correlate with our predictors, they were not included in 
primary analyses. However, severity will be discussed later as a moderator in 
exploratory analyses.  
We also included a 4-item measure of identification with the participant’s 
sorority or fraternity (Doosje et al., 1995) and the Inclusion of Other in Self Circle 
Task (Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992), but because some of participants’ responses 
referenced individual wrongdoings and others referenced group-based wrongdoings, 
we did not find either of these measures suitable to include in subsequent analyses. 
Finally, we collected demographic information about participants’ age, gender and 
ethnicity. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for all study variables can be found in 
Table 14. Many participants had a difficult time recalling a specific instance of a 
member of a sorority or fraternity member committing a wrongdoing. Because 
including only participants who wrote about a specific incident drastically reduced 
our power, we included participants who wrote about general wrongdoings (e.g., 
“Very often within my sorority I hear girls in my chapter putting down other houses 
and girls in other chapters”).  
First we looked at dignity and face scores in order to ascertain differences 




multiple regression analyses to regress appraisals, emotions and behavior on dignity 
and face scores in the same manner that we did in Study 1. 
Dignity and Face 
We conducted t-tests to determine whether there was a mean difference in 
dignity and face scores between the European American and East Asian sample. East 
Asians endorsed face more strongly than European Americans, although this 
difference was only marginally significant (M = 3.51, SD = .55 and M = 3.27, SD = 
.56, respectively; t(77) = 1.86, p = .066). As in Study 1, dignity scores did not differ 
between East Asians and European Americans (M = 4.04, SD = .43 and M = 3.98, SD 
= .49 respectively; t(77) = .49, n.s.). The marginal difference in face scores, as 
compared to Study 1, might be accounted for by the distinctive Greek culture in 
which our subjects were immersed. Sororities and fraternities are unique 
organizations that have strong cultures, and so might not be too surprising that East 
Asians resembled European American students more than in Study 1.  
Appraisals 
We conducted hierarchical regression analyses to examine the predictive 
effect of dignity and face on justice- and image-based appraisals, moderated by 
whether the situation occurred in public or private. We ran separate equations for 
justice and image appraisals. In the first step we entered mean-centered dignity and 
face scores and an effect-coded term representing whether the situation was public or 
private. This term was coded such that -1 = private and 1 = public to increase 




interaction terms that were created by multiplying the effect-coded public/private 
term with the mean-centered dignity and face scores. 
Hypothesis 1.a predicted that face would be positively associated with 
appraisals of image threat, but only in public situations. In the first step of the model, 
public/private context was a significant predictor such that public situations resulted 
in higher appraisals of image-threat (! = .36, p < .001; see Table 15). Although face 
was not a significant predictor (! = -.031), there was a nonsignificant trend for dignity 
to negatively predict image threat appraisals, such that higher dignity scores were 
related to lower appraisals of image threat (! = -.16, p = .13). Neither of the 
interactions involving dignity or face with public/private were significant. Therefore, 
we found no support for Hypothesis 1.a. 
Hypothesis 1.b predicted that dignity would be positively associated with 
appraisals of justice threat. There were no significant predictors in the full model (see 
Table 16). Therefore, we found no support for Hypothesis 1.b. 
Emotions 
We conducted hierarchical regression analyses to examine the predictive 
effect of dignity and face on guilt and shame, moderated by whether the situation 
occurred in public or private. We ran separate equations for guilt and shame. In the 
first step we entered mean-centered dignity and face scores and an effect-coded term 
representing whether the situation was public or private. This term was coded such 
that -1 = private and 1 = public to increase interpretability of the regression 




multiplying the effect-coded public/private term with the mean-centered dignity and 
face scores. 
Hypothesis 2.a predicted that face would be positively associated with shame, 
especially in public situations. The public/private context variable was a significant 
predictor of shame in the first step of the model (see Table 17), such that public 
situations induced greater shame (! = .34, p < .005), but none of the other predictors 
were significant. Therefore, we found no support for Hypothesis 2.a. 
Hypothesis 2.b predicted that dignity would be positively associated with 
guilt. None of the variables in any of the models were significant predictors of guilt 
(see Table 18). Therefore, we found no support for Hypothesis 2.b. 
Behavior 
We conducted hierarchical regression analyses to examine the predictive 
effect of dignity and face on approach, distancing and avoidance-oriented behavioral 
intentions, moderated by whether the situation occurred in public or private. We ran 
separate equations for approach, distancing and withdrawal. In the first step of each 
equation we entered mean-centered dignity and face scores and an effect-coded term 
representing whether the situation was public or private. This term was coded such 
that -1 = private and 1 = public to increase interpretability of the regression 
coefficient. In the second step we entered two interaction terms that were created by 
multiplying the effect-coded public/private term with the mean-centered dignity and 
face scores. 
Hypothesis 3.a predicted that face would be positively associated with the 




variables in any of the models were significant predictors of distancing behavior (see 
Table 19). Therefore, we found no support for Hypothesis 3.a. 
Hypothesis 3.a predicted that face would be positively associated with the 
tendency to withdraw from the situation. Although we did not find support for this 
hypothesis, there was a marginal effect for dignity in the first step of the model such 
that dignity negatively predicted the tendency to withdraw (! = -.21, p = .073; see 
Table 20).  
Hypothesis 3.b predicted that dignity would be positively associated with 
reparative behavior. None of the variables in any of the models were significant 
predictors of reparative behavior (see Table 21). Therefore, we found no support for 
Hypothesis 3.b. 
Exploratory Analyses 
Because face did not predict any of our expected appraisal, emotion or 
behavioral outcomes, we explored potential moderators. Given the wide range of 
situations recalled, we suspected that some of the situations reported were not severe 
enough to elicit face-relevant appraisals. Thus, we conducted further hierarchical 
regression analyses to test the moderating effect of severity on the Public/Private x 
Face interaction. We entered centered severity and face scores in the first step of the 
model, along with the effect-coded term for public/private context (-1 = private, 1 = 
public). We entered interaction terms for Public/Private x Face, Face x Severity and 
Public/Private x Severity in the second step of the model. Finally, we entered a three-




centered severity and face variables with the effect-coded term for public/private 
context. 
Along with a main effect for public/private context, as we had found in our 
original analyses, we found a marginal interaction for Face x Public/Private x 
Severity (r2" = .041; ! = .21, p = .056; see Table 22 and Figures 6 and 7). Slope 
difference tests revealed that when the transgression was severe, high-face 
participants perceived greater image threat in public situations more than in private 
(t(75) = 2.60, p = .01). 
Discussion 
We did not find direct support for any of our hypotheses in Study 2. Across 
the board, public context was the strongest predictor of image-threat appraisals and 
shame. However, another interesting finding emerged. Although dignity did not 
predict the tendency to make appraisals about threats to justice or intentions to repair 
the situation, it did negatively predict the tendency to make appraisals about threats to 
one’s image and the tendency to withdraw from the situation. This trend suggests that 
dignity might be related to the importance of rejecting others’ opinions and norms 
against walking away from a problem. 
Another intriguing finding surfaced in our exploratory analyses: Face did 
predict image-threat appraisals in public more than in private, but only when the 
transgression was considered severe. This moderation could have occurred because 
some of the situations reported were not severe enough to induce image concerns. 
Alternatively, it could be that some high-face participants did not want to 




order to avoid considering potential threats to their image, but when the situation was 
severe they could not ignore the consequences.  
This unexpected finding leads us to speculate about other potential factors 
moderating the relationship between face and appraisals, emotions and behavior. 
Because of the importance of maintaining intragroup harmony, closeness with the 
wrongdoer could be another moderator. However, this was not an appropriate 
variable to test in this study as some participants recalled wrongdoings associated 
with an individual and others recalled wrongdoings associated with the group at large, 
so we include IOS accordingly in Study 3 to explore as a moderator. 
Although the mindset priming approach utilized in Study 2 was strong with 
respect to external validity, it was difficult to have confidence in our findings with 
such diversity in the kinds of situations recalled. Therefore, we decided to test our 






Chapter 4: Study 3 
 
In Studies 1 and 2, we provided a basis for understanding the cross-cultural 
differences in appraisals, emotional reactions and action intentions in response to 
hypothetical and past ingroup transgressions against outgroup members. Using a new 
experimental game, Study 3 examined real behavior in the laboratory in response to 
an ingroup member’s transgression against a stranger. 
Participants, Design, and Procedure 
Participants were 128 undergraduate and graduate students at the University 
of Maryland (96 female, 31 male, 1 unknown; mean age = 21.11). East Asian and 
European American participants were recruited through campus-wide flyers and 
student organization listservs, and those who signed up to participate were asked to 
bring a same-sex friend with them to their study appointment. In many cases, 
participants brought a friend of the same ethnicity. Friends brought to the study were 
also included in our dataset, unless they were not European American or East Asian 
(n = 10). Participants who misunderstood events that occurred during the exercise 
(i.e., they did not notice that their friend committed a wrongdoing, n = 9) or failed the 
public/private manipulation check (n = 15) were also removed from analyses because 
these individuals’ responses either indicate that they might not have been paying 
attention, or they misinterpreted significant events (i.e. thinking their friend gave 80 
tokens rather than took 80 tokens would elicit very different appraisals). Some 




of 98 individuals (74 female, 24 male, mean age = 21.02). Of the sample, 41 
participants identified themselves as European American, and 57 participants 
identified themselves as East Asian.  
Upon arrival, participants were told that they would complete a computer-
based community interaction exercise involving the allocation of resources with their 
friend and another pair of friends located in the lab upstairs. They were seated in 
separate rooms and completed the exercise on the computer without ever seeing their 
friend or other participants. In fact, there were no other participants, and all players’ 
actions were pre-programmed by the computer. Participants completed separate 
exercises and did not actually engage with their friend during the exercise.  
All participants provided consent before beginning the study. Prior to the 
computerized exercise, participants completed the Inclusion of Other in Self Scale 
(IOS; Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992). Participants first read instructions about the 
rules of the game, and were quizzed on the rules at the end of the instructions section. 
Following the quiz, the exercise began. During the exercise, the participant witnessed 
their friend commit an infraction against one of the outgroup participants. Then, the 
participant had an opportunity to punish and/or reward the outgroup victim and their 
friend. The public/private nature of the transgression was manipulated. Following the 
exercise, participants were asked to complete measures about their experience in the 
game, including appraisals, emotional reactions and other behavioral intentions 
associated with the ingroup member’s transgression. After a distractor task, 
participants completed the Dignity and Face scale and demographic measures. Once 




purpose of the study and the deception involved in the friend’s transgression during 
the exercise. Participants were then thanked and paid $15 for their participation in the 
hour-long study. 
Public/Private Manipulation 
Half of participants were assigned to the public condition (n = 53), and half of 
participants were assigned to the private condition (n = 45). In the public condition, 
participants were told that they would meet with the other participants and the 
experimenter at the end of the study to discuss the results of the exercise, and were 
instructed to wear a nametag for that meeting. Participants in the public condition also 
saw their name, their friend’s name, and the other participants’ names5 on the screen 
throughout the exercise. Therefore, all decisions made during the exercise were easily 
identifiable. The participant and his/her friend were represented by blue avatars 
during the exercise, and the other friend pair was represented by orange avatars.  
In the private condition, participants were told that they would never have to 
meet the other friend pair, and that the experimenter would not know how he or she 
had behaved during the game. Names were not displayed on the screen, and instead 
players were identified by aliases like “Player 1” and “Player 2.” Like in the public 
condition, the participant and his or her friend were represented by blue avatars and 
the other friend pair in orange avatars, so that participants would be able to identify 
themselves and their friend. 
                                                
5 Other participants’ names were same-sex names that were pre-tested and thought to be equally likely 





Community Interactions Exercise 
We adapted a “gift-giving game” from paradigms used in past research 
(Shinada, Yamagishi & Ohmura, 2004; Gelfand et al., unpublished data). Participants 
were told that the players would be able to distribute tokens amongst themselves 
during the exercise. It was emphasized that the point of the exercise was not to earn 
the most tokens, but rather to understand how people behave in everyday life. This 
point was elaborated on with bogus citations about how the game had been applied to 
real-world topics like business and diplomacy.  
Participants were told that in each round, all players would roll a die. The 
player with the highest roll would assume the role of “trader,” and the player with the 
second highest roll would assume the role of “receiver.” There could only be one 
trader, so if two people rolled the same highest number (e.g., two people roll a six), 
the die would be rolled again. However, there could be multiple receivers if more 
than one person rolled the same second highest number. For example, if one person 
rolled a six, two people rolled a four and one person rolled a two, both people who 
rolled the four would become receivers. This rule was illustrated in an example 
round.  
Participants were told that the number of rounds would be randomized, and 
that some rounds would be “giving” rounds and other rounds would be “taking” 
rounds. During “giving” rounds, the trader would give a number of his or her own 
tokens to the receiver(s). During “taking” rounds, the trader would take a number of 




“giving” and “taking” rounds. During “giving” rounds, the trader should give at least 
25 of their tokens to each receiver. During “taking” rounds, the trader should take no 
more than 25 tokens from each receiver. Participants also received information 
pertinent to the public/private manipulation. At the end of the instruction session, 
participants took a short quiz regarding the rules of the game, including the purpose 
of the game, which color the player and his or her friend would be represented by, 
and the upper limit of how many tokens should be taken during a taking round. Then, 
the exercise began.  
In the exercise, all die rolls and player actions besides the participant’s own 
were pre-programmed by the computer. All participants started out with 100 tokens. 
The first round was a “giving” round. One outgroup player rolled the highest number 
and became the trader. All other players, including the participant, rolled the same 
number, thus all other players will became receivers. In this round, participants saw 
the outgroup player donate 30 tokens to each of the three players (five more than the 
required 25). This established that the norm of the game was to be generous and 
cooperate, because players will not cooperate when they expect other members to 
defect (Shinada, Yamagishi & Ohmura, 2004; Yamagishi, 2005). A summary of the 
round events was displayed for several seconds before proceeding onto the second 
round. See Appendix J for sample screen shots from the computerized exercise. 
Ingroup Transgression 
 The second round was a “taking” round. In this round, the ingroup player 
rolled the highest number, becoming the trader, and the outgroup player who was not 




on the actions of the player in the previous round, it would be expected that the 
ingroup player would also play fairly. However, the ingroup player took 80 tokens 
from the outgroup player, 55 more than permitted. Thus, this move should have been 
seen as an unfair transgression toward the outgroup player. 
Ingroup Punishment and Outgroup Reparations 
Before the third round, a message appeared indicating that it would be the 
final round. The third round was a “giving” round. In this round, the participant rolled 
the highest number and became the trader. The ingroup member and the outgroup 
victim both had the second highest roll; thus, participants were able to allocate some 
or all of their tokens to each of the two players. Participants were reminded that they 
had 130 tokens and were asked how many tokens they wanted to give to each player.  
Because participants may have been motivated to “equalize” the difference 
between their friend and the victim (i.e., see that the victim has 50 tokens and the 
friend has 210), the number of tokens that each player currently possessed was hidden 
from the screen throughout the game. Thus, the behavior of the players is the detail 
that should have remained salient rather than the present distribution of tokens 
between players. 
Outgroup reparations were operationalized by the number of tokens given to 
the outgroup victim. Distancing was operationalized by the number of tokens given to 
the friend, such that lower numbers represented greater distance. Ingroup punishment 
was operationalized by the absolute difference in tokens allocated between the 
ingroup member and the outgroup member, as well as the ratio difference in tokens 




work distinguishing between “ingroup love” and “outgroup hate,” or in other words, 
whether people display ingroup favoritism out of concern for their ingroup or hate for 
their outgroup (Halevy, Bornstein & Sagiv, 2008). Our measure distinguishes 
between the opposite, “ingroup hate” and “outgroup love”; that is, whether people’s 
interpersonal behavior is geared toward providing reparations for the victimized 
outgroup or punishing the transgressing ingroup. 
Messages 
At the end of the exercise, participants were given an opportunity to send up 
to three messages to other players. Participants were able to write freely and could 
indicate to whom the message should be sent. Participants could choose to send each 
message to their friend, the victim, the victim’s friend, or some combination of all 
three. For example, a participant could send the first message to their friend, the 
second message to the victim and the victim’s friend, and the third message to all 
three players. Participants were not forced to send any messages. Therefore, the 
minimum number of recipients for the three messages was zero (i.e. the participant 
did not send any messages) and the maximum number of recipients for the three 
messages was nine (i.e. the participant sent three messages, and each message was 
sent to all three players). 
Measures 
Dignity and face. As in Studies 1 and 2, we included the personal value 
Dignity and Face Scale. Because cultural differences have been recently shown to be 




Shteynberg, Gelfand & Kim, 2009), we also included this referent for the scale in this 
study. In particular, this version of the scale asked participants “To what extent did 
your parents, while you were growing up, believe…?” as opposed to “To what extent 
do you believe…?” 
Appraisals. In order to preserve the cover story about the community 
interactions exercise, appraisal measures were not as explicit as in Study 1 and Study 
2. For instance, we were unable to ask about severity of the transgression in this 
study. Instead, we first asked participants if their friend had taken a turn, and if so, 
whether it was a giving or taking round. We then asked how selfish, generous and fair 
they thought their friend was. These questions served two purposes. First, subsequent 
questions were related to the friend’s taking behavior, so we had to reduce suspicion 
by making it seem like these questions were asked based on their response (i.e. “You 
indicated your friend took a turn…”) and not because we already knew about the 
friend’s behavior. Second, this allowed us to identify and remove participants who 
misunderstood their friend’s role in the game.  
We included items about perceived injustices during the exercise that were 
framed very generally (e.g., “There was a breach of fairness during the exercise”) and 
participants’ concerns about being associated with their friend during their friend’s 
turn  (e.g., “My image/reputation was at stake”). These items were written to sound 
quite vague rather than tailored to the specific offense so as to not make it obvious 
that the friend’s transgression had been rigged.  
We performed Principal Axis Factoring analyses to examine the underlying 




individual items, we arrived at two factors: Justice consisted of five items (three were 
reverse-coded such that higher scores reflected the perception that there had been an 
injustice, e.g. “the participants all received what they deserved”; ! = .77), and Image 
Threat consisted of one item (“My image/reputation was at stake”)6. Please see Table 
23 for factor loadings and Appendix K for the full measure. 
Emotional reactions. Participants were asked to indicate the emotions they 
experienced as well as other mental states during their friend’s turn and their own 
turn. Because we did not want to induce suspicion by over-emphasizing guilt and 
shame, we changed some of the original items from the guilt and shame inventory 
used in Studies 1 and 2 and included several distractor items from the PANAS 
inventory such as “active” and “surprised.” However, unlike in Studies 1 and 2, 
Principal Axis Factoring analyses revealed that all of the guilt and shame items 
loaded onto one factor rather than emerging as two clear guilt and shame factors. 
Thus, we created a composite Guilt/Shame factor for subsequent analyses (! = .90). 
Please see Appendix L for the full measure. 
Behavioral responses. In addition to the actual token-giving behavior 
measured during the game, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they wanted to engage in other behaviors during the game, reflecting reparative and 
distancing tendencies. For example, a reparation-oriented behavior item was “I 
wanted my friend to apologize” and a distancing-oriented item was “I wanted to be 
                                                
6 There were two additional factors that emerged. One item, “Other people were aware of my 
association with my friend,” loaded separately and was not correlated with the image threat item, so it 
was not included in image-threat analyses. There was a second factor, Empathy, which consisted of 
three items (e.g. “I felt concerned for one or more of the participants during the exercise”). Because 
nothing was found for Empathy, an unexpected factor, it will not be discussed further. Additionally, 
the factor for Image-threat included two identical items; one related to the friend’s turn and one related 
to the participant’s turn. Because we are most interested reactions to the friend’s turn, only the image-




unassociated with my friend.” We also included several distractor items so as to not 
make it appear as if it were expected that the friend would commit an offense (e.g., “I 
wanted one of the other players to apologize to my friend”).  
We conducted Principal Axis Factoring analyses with a direct oblimin rotation 
to examine the underlying structure of our items. Based on the factor loadings and 
correlations between individual items, we decided upon four factors: Reparative 
behavior consisted of three items (! = .76), Avoidance consisted of three items (! = 
.61), Distancing consisted of two items (! = .86), and Punishment consisted of one 
item. Please see Table 24 for factor loadings and Appendix M for the full measure. 
Additional measures. Participants completed the IOS circle task (Aron, Aron 
& Smollan, 1992) to indicate their closeness with their friend prior to the exercise. 
The seven circles demonstrated the overlap between “self” and “other” and were 
coded such that “1” represented the lowest amount of overlap and “7” represented the 
greatest amount of overlap. This variable was not found to correlate with predictors 
and so it was not included in the primary analyses. However, it will be discussed 
further as a moderator in exploratory analyses. Participants also completed several 
items as part of a manipulation check (see Appendix N) and were asked demographic 
questions about their age, gender and ethnicity. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for all study variables can be found in 
Table 25. First, we looked for differences between our East Asian and European 
American samples in the Dignity and Face scales, for both the individual-level and 




analyses to explore the relationship between our predictors and token-giving 
behavior. We then conducted hierarchical regression analyses to explore the 
relationship between our predictors and appraisals, emotions and non-token related 
behavioral intentions. Finally, we conducted some further exploratory analyses to 
examine the moderating effect of relationship closeness on token-giving behavior. 
Manipulation Check 
Participants in the private condition indicated that they felt more anonymous 
then participants in the public condition, during their friend’s turn (M = 2.82, SD = 
1.15 and M = 1.87, SD = 1.09, respectively; t(96) = 4.20, p < .001) and their own turn 
(M = 2.90, SD = 1.17 and M = 1.77, SD = 1.01, respectively; t(96) = 5.05, p < .001). 
Participants had also been asked whether information about their behavior would be 
shared with others and if they would have to meet the other participants later. Those 
who answered incorrectly were removed from analyses (n = 15). 
Dignity and Face 
As in Studies 1 and 2, we analyzed the personal-values dignity and Face scale 
with the five-item dignity and six-item face subscales. Dignity scores (! = .50) did 
not differ between East Asian and European American participants (M = 3.22, SD = 
.488 and M = 3.31, SD = .506, respectively; t(96) = .89, n.s.) and face scores (! = .70) 
were only marginally higher for East Asians (M = 3.37, SD = .538 and M = 3.15, SD 
= .620, respectively; t(96) = .89, p < .10).  
Because of issues of socialization while living in a foreign country and 




(Shteynberg, Gelfand & Kim, 2009), we decided to explore the version of the scale 
framed at the level of family upbringing. Reliability for the dignity subscale was ! = 
.65, and reliability for the face subscale was ! = .80. We looked for differences 
between our East Asian and European American sample. As expected, East Asians 
endorsed the concept of face more strongly than European Americans (M = 3.83, SD 
=  .593 and M = 3.51, SD = .77, respectively; t(96) = 2.32, p < .05) and European 
Americans endorsed the concept of dignity more strongly than East Asians (M = 3.80, 
SD =  .64 and M = 3.40, SD = .61, respectively; t(96) = 3.18, p < .005).  
Although results for the subsequent analyses were similar between the 
personal values and descriptive norm versions of the measure, we decided that the 
descriptive norm measure would be more representative of our conceptualization of 
dignity and face as models of self-worth grounded in culture (as opposed to 
individual beliefs). Thus, we will only address results related to this version of the 
scale. 
Tokens 
We removed three outliers from token analyses because two individuals gave 
away all 130 of their tokens and one participant only gave away one token (with 
outliers removed, M = 62.8, SD = 23.76). We conducted hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses including mean-centered terms for dignity and face along with an 
effect-coded term for condition (-1 = private, 1 = public) in the first step, and two 
interaction terms for face and dignity with condition in the third step created by 
multiplying the effect-coded condition term once each with the mean-centered dignity 




 Outgroup reparations (Number of tokens given to the victim). The mean 
number of tokens given to the victim, out of a possible 130, was 32.13. There were no 
significant predictors in any step of the model (see Table 26). 
 Ingroup distancing (Number of tokens given to the friend). The mean number 
of tokens given to the friend, out of a possible 130, was 30.67. There were no 
significant predictors in any step of the model (see Table 27). 
 Ingroup punishment (Absolute difference of tokens between the victim and 
friend). The absolute difference was calculated by subtracting the number of tokens 
given to the friend from the number of tokens given to the victim. The mean absolute 
difference in tokens allocated was 1.45, meaning that on average participants gave 
1.45 more tokens to the victim than to the friend. None of the variables in any steps of 
the model significantly predicted the absolute difference of tokens given to the victim 
over the friend (see Table 28). 
Ingroup punishment (Proportion of tokens given to victim over friend). The 
proportion of tokens given to the victim was calculated by dividing the number of 
tokens given to the friend by the sum of tokens given to the victim and the friend. The 
mean proportion of tokens given to the victim was .5095, meaning that participants 
on average gave 50.95% of their tokens to the victim. None of the variables in any 
step of the model significantly predicted the proportion of tokens given to the victim 
(See Table 29). 
Messages to Participants 
Because participants were not required to send any messages, there was very 




victim’s friend. Therefore, we did not have enough power to perform an analysis of 
the message content. 
Appraisals 
We conducted hierarchical multiple regression analyses in order to test the 
hypothesis that dignity predicts Justice appraisals and face predicts Image-threat 
appraisals in public situations. We entered mean-centered terms for dignity and face 
along with an effect-coded term for condition (-1 = private, 1 = public) in the first 
step. In the second step we entered two interaction terms for face and dignity with 
condition, created by multiplying the effect-coded condition term once each with the 
mean-centered face and dignity terms. Three items in the justice appraisals factor 
were reverse-coded prior to creating the composite term.  
 Hypothesis 1.a predicted that face would be related to appraisals that one’s 
image was threatened, but only in public. None of the predictors in the model 
accounted for the degree to which participants perceived a threat to their image (see 
Table 30). Therefore, we found no support for Hypothesis 1.a. 
Hypothesis 1.b predicted that dignity would predict appraisals that an injustice 
had taken place. This hypothesis was not directly supported. In the first step of the 
model, face predicted justice appraisals such that higher face scores were related to 
appraisals that people had behaved fairly during the exercise (! =  -.21, p < .05; see 
Table 31). This was qualified by a marginal two-way interaction for Condition x 
Dignity in the full model (r2" = .071; ! =  .27, p < .01; see Figure 8). Dignity was 
related to fewer appraisals about justice in private (! = -.51, p < .01) as compared to 




Emotions Experienced During the Friend’s Turn 
We conducted hierarchical regression analyses identical to the ones performed 
with the composite appraisal variables, with the guilt/shame composite term 
associated with the friend’s turn entered as the criterion variable.  
Because we ended up with a single Guilt/Shame factor, our original 
hypotheses regarding emotion were not pertinent to the present analyses. However, 
there was a marginal two-way Condition x Face interaction in the full model (r2" = 
.04; ! = -.20, p = .054; see Table 32 and Figure 9). Although neither of the simple 
slopes were significant, it appears that the trend for face to be associated with 
increased guilt in the private condition was driving the interaction (! = .21; p = .12). 
Behavior 
We conducted hierarchical regression analyses identical to the ones performed 
with the composite appraisal and emotion variables, with the withdrawal, distancing, 
punishing and reparative behavior terms entered as criterion variables. 
 Hypothesis 3.a predicted that face would be associated with the desire to 
distance oneself from the ingroup wrongdoer, especially in public. We found no 
support for this hypothesis, but there was a significant two-way Condition x Dignity 
interaction (r2" = .061; ! = .24, p < .05; see Table 33) in the full model such that 
dignity was related to a decreased desire to disassociate with the friend in the private 
condition (! = -.48, p < .05).   
Hypothesis 3.a also predicted that face would be associated with the desire to 
withdraw from the situation (i.e., exit the game early), especially when the 




34). First, there was a significant Condition x Face interaction (r2" = .14; ! = -.29, p < 
.005; see Figure 10) such that face was associated with a decreased desire to exit the 
game in the public condition (! = -.59, p < .01) as compared to in private (! = .35, 
n.s.). Because the interaction was in the opposite direction than predicted, we did not 
find support for Hypothesis 3.a. Second, there was a Condition x Dignity interaction 
similar to the one found with the composite distancing variable (r2" = .14; ! = .23, p 
< .05; see Figure 11), such that dignity was associated with decreased withdrawal 
behavior in the private condition (! = -.58, p = .01) as compared to the public 
condition (! = .18, n.s.).  
Finally, Hypothesis 3.a predicted that face would be associated with the desire 
to distance oneself from the friend via making the friend incur consequences for his 
or her behavior (i.e., punishment), but only when the transgression occurred in public. 
None of the predictors were significant in any step of the model (see Table 35). 
Therefore, this part of Hypothesis 3.a was not supported.   
Hypothesis 3.b predicted that dignity would be associated with the desire to 
make reparations toward the victim. However, none of the predictors in the model 
accounted for the degree to which participants wished to make amends with the 
victim (see Table 36). Therefore, we found no support for Hypothesis 3.b. 
Exploratory Analyses 
Because none of our predictors influenced token-giving behavior, we began to 
explore potential moderators. We surmised that for participants who endorse face as a 
model of self-worth, the strength of the relationship with the friend might be an 




regression analyses including a three-way interaction for Condition x Face x IOS. In 
addition to the terms included in the original model, we entered a mean-centered term 
for IOS in the first step, and two-way interaction terms for Face x IOS and Condition 
x IOS in the second step. Some notable preliminary findings are described in what 
follows. 
 Ingroup distancing (Number of tokens given to the friend). In the first step of 
the model, there was a main effect for IOS such that closeness was negatively related 
to token-giving behavior toward the friend (! = -.21, p < .05; see Table 37). This 
effect was qualified by a marginal two-way interaction of Face x IOS in the second 
step of the model (r2" = .047; ! = -.25, p < .05). Simple slope tests revealed that 
closeness was related to a decrease in tokens given to the friend when the participant 
was high on face (! = -5.58, p = .005) as compared to low on face (! = -.67, n.s.). The 
three-way interaction in the full model was not significant. 
 Ingroup punishment (Absolute difference of tokens between the victim and 
friend). There was a three-way interaction for Condition x Face x IOS in the full 
model (r2" = .047; ! = -.25, p < .05; see Table 38 and Figures 12 and 13).  Simple 
slope tests revealed that face was associated with less ingroup punishment, but only in 
private and when the relationship with the friend was not close (! = -11.42, p < .01; 
evaluated at one standard deviation below the IOS mean). In public, face did not 
predict token-giving behavior, although there was a nonsignificant trend for face to be 
related to greater ingroup punishment when participants were not close to the friend 




Ingroup punishment (Proportion of tokens given to victim over friend). Again, 
there was a marginal interaction for Condition x Face x IOS in the full model (r2" = 
.041; ! = -.24, p = .057; see Table 39 and Figures 14 and 15). The pattern was the 
same as the measure of absolute difference in tokens. Face was associated with less 
ingroup punishment but only in private and when the relationship was not close (! = -
6.14, p < .05; evaluated at one standard deviation below the IOS mean7). These 
findings suggest that the relationship between face and ingroup punishment is not 
uniform. It was in the private condition that high-face participants gave more tokens 
to the victim than the friend, and notably, only for relationships that were less close. 
Therefore, the nature of the relationship appears to be an important moderator. 
Discussion 
We found no direct empirical support for our hypotheses. On the contrary, we 
actually found evidence in stark contradiction to our hypotheses. Even after a blatant 
rule violation, face was related to perceptions that everyone had behaved fairly during 
the exercise and predicted decreased willingness to withdraw from the situation in 
public. Dignity, in comparison, resembled some of the predictions we had made for 
face. Dignity was related to distancing and avoidance behavioral tendencies in public, 
but not in private. Perhaps participants who endorse the justice values associated with 
dignity cultures do not want to associate with those who break fairness norms, 
although this is not a trend we observed in Studies 1 or 2. 
In conjunction with our exploratory analyses, the results raise questions about 
how face operates quite differently depending on the context. First, closeness to the 
                                                
7 The dependent variable was multiplied by 100 prior to analyses for better interpretability of the 




friend emerged as an important qualifier in our exploratory analyses. In private, high-
face participants who were not close to their friends punished the ingroup member 
less in private, but slightly more in public. This interesting pattern suggests that face 
concerns may be closely related to the nature of the relationship, and are not absent 
when removed from the public eye. Perhaps in public, high-face participants felt able 
to distance themselves from friends with whom they were not close. In private, 
however, high-face participants were concerned with saving face in front of their 
friend, particularly when the relationship was not as strong.  
Second, the fact that high-face participants indicated that everyone played 
fairly suggests that they might not have thought taking coins in an experimental game 
was a problem, and did not find the offense to be particularly egregious. Despite that 
everyone witnessed the same offense, face participants were less affected by their 
friend’s behavior. This raises the question of whether these participants may have 
been motivated to distort the offense so as to avoid experiencing vicarious guilt or 
shame, especially in public. Although not in line with our original hypotheses, these 
findings shed light on new theoretical directions for the study of ingroup wrongdoings 




Chapter 5:  General Discussion 
 
 
Given the critical implications for intergroup relations, the role of culture in 
emotional responses to ingroup transgressions is a topic in need of greater 
understanding, which was the purpose of this research. Earlier we discussed how a 
process model of emotions could afford a better understanding of how the same 
ingroup transgression can lead to vastly different outcomes across cultures due to 
differences in focal concerns. We argued that cultural models of self-worth influence 
the trajectory of appraisals, emotional experiences and behaviors that unfold after 
witnessing an ingroup transgression. Specifically, we predicted that the justice 
concerns associated with dignity cultures and image concerns associated with face 
cultures could offer an explanation as to why these cultures have different key 
priorities in resolving a transgression (e.g., preserving ingroup reputation versus 
restoring justice), which promote emotional experiences like guilt and shame and 
action tendencies like reparations and avoidance, respectively.  
We found partial support for our theory in Study 1. As predicted, face was 
related to the tendency to distance oneself from the fallout of an ingroup 
transgression, mediated by appraisals of image threat and shame, but only when the 
wrongdoing occurred in the public eye. Indeed, individuals who subscribe to a model 
of self-worth defined by reputation are particularly concerned about events that 
threaten one’s public image, which introduce downstream consequences for emotions 




member with the tarnished reputation can serve as effective methods of “damage 
control” when experiencing vicarious shame. 
Unexpected findings in Study 3 unearthed some new complexities 
surrounding the relationship between face and responses to ingroup wrongdoings. 
Whereas we expected participants to experience shame and distance themselves from 
their friend, especially in public, we found the reverse. Face was related to more guilt 
in private than in public, and participants wanted to withdraw from the situation more 
in private than in public. Whether these findings are actually in direct opposition to 
our hypotheses, or are a reflection of motivated distortion, is a matter for further 
discussion. 
We did not find any direct support for our hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between dignity and justice appraisals, guilt and reparative behavior. 
Justice appraisals and guilt were associated with reparative behavior in Study 1, but 
the link between dignity and these outcomes was not there. Because most of our 
subjects were entrenched in the values of a dignity-oriented society, we ran into 
ceiling effects with items regarding apologies and reparations. Instead, dignity was 
related to lower image-threat appraisals and the tendency to not withdraw from the 
situation in Study 2, and interacted with public/private context in Study 3 in that 
dignity was associated with less withdrawal, but only in private as opposed to public. 
Of course, people in dignity cultures are not totally immune to others’ opinions. 




Contribution to Theory and Research 
This work makes several marked contributions to the vicarious guilt and 
shame and cross-cultural literatures. First, we add to the existing guilt and shame 
literature, which has been limited to North American and Western European domains, 
by exploring other cultural factors that influence emotional and behavioral reactions 
to ingroup wrongdoings. Although previous work has given attention to the tendency 
for different behavioral tendencies to emerge from the emotions guilt and shame 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007), what we have done is 
highlighted some of the factors that give way to this divergence of emotional and 
behavioral responses. Notably, individuals from face cultures may be predisposed to 
responding to ingroup transgressions in ways differently than what is currently 
reflected in the vicarious guilt and shame literature. Our results do not provide any 
further clarification with respect to the guilt and shame debate. Shame was associated 
with concerns about image (Study 1) and public situations (Study 2) but was not 
clearly demarcated from guilt, particularly in Study 3. This muddled distinction 
reinforces our emphasis on the appraisals and behavioral outcomes surrounding an 
ingroup transgression in the present research. 
It is worth noting that although our hypotheses projected divergent paths of 
appraisals, emotions and behavioral outcomes for dignity and face participants, none 
of these responses are mutually exclusive. In addition to image threat, shame and 
avoidance, face was also related to justice appraisals and guilt in Study 1. Face might 
heighten awareness of other threats that have implications for one’s ingroup 




relationship between dignity and withdrawal in Study 2, and an interaction with 
public context in Study 3. Our analyses allowed us to explore the relationship 
between dignity and face with both approach and avoidance oriented responses.  
Finally, we add to the cross-cultural literature by exploring two constructs, 
dignity and face, which are quite pertinent to the study of self-relevant phenomena 
such as ingroup transgressions. Until now, these dimensions of culture had not been 
explored in the domain of intergroup behavior. Through this work on ingroup 
transgressions we achieved the intermediate goal of better understanding the 
constitution of elements comprising dignity and face and how these models of self-
worth interact with contextual variables to predict behavior.  
Needless to say, our three studies each have their own strengths and weakness 
with respect to both methodological soundness and the ability to test the crux of the 
theory. Where we increased methodological rigor, we were sometimes faced with the 
trade-off of decreased ability to test the hypotheses as intended. We outline the 
limitations and future directions of this research program in what follows. 
Methodology Meets Theory: A Trade-Off 
The methods employed in Study 1 allowed for a good test of the theory as all 
participants read the same ingroup transgression scenarios, which were similar in 
severity. However, our outcome measures were not necessarily reliable proxies for 
actual behavior. The mindset priming method we used in Study 2 allowed us to 
explore individuals’ actual responses to a past ingroup transgression, within a unique 
social culture that all participants shared. However, we were unable to control for the 




that our participants may not have been representative of prototypical dignity and face 
culture members. Study 3 provided a rigorous test of the theory by subjecting every 
participant to the same ingroup transgression. However, we were unable to tap into 
emotional reactions and appraisals in the same way as we could in Studies 1 and 2. 
Moreover, it is difficult to simulate an offense in the lab that compares to the types of 
offenses individuals witness in their everyday lives (i.e, the wrongdoing of the friend 
taking too many tokens may not have been taken seriously). Yet, the fruits of our 
labor are not in vain as the limitations of this work gave rise to unexpected findings 
and generated new ideas. These considerations lead us to propose 1) an expansion of 
the theory and 2) a discussion of methodological improvements for future research. 
Theoretical Expansion 
We were able to find partial support for our original theory in Study 1. The 
results of Studies 2 and 3, however, highlighted theoretical nuances warranting 
further investigation. We address these theoretical issues below. 
The Nature of the Offense 
We originally hypothesized quite broadly about dignity and face cultures’ 
responses to ingroup wrongdoings. Because we did not initially theorize that reactions 
would depend on the severity or strength of the situation, severity was not measured 
consistently throughout the three studies, nor did we ask any other questions about the 
nature of the situation outside the domain of justice or image concerns. The vicarious 
guilt and shame literature also does not distinguish between different types of 




a variety of realistic ingroup offenses that were similar in severity. In Study 2, 
however, some participants discussed minor, relational incidents involving bad-
mouthing or rude behavior, whereas others discussed more severe, harmful instances 
of sexual harassment and violence. The diversity of responses may have accounted 
for the lack of consistency in the relationship between dignity and face and appraisals, 
emotions and behavior. We expected that the controlled context of the ingroup 
transgression in Study 3 would offer suitable conditions to test the theory, but it 
turned out that many participants were relatively unaffected by the friend’s 
transgression. Though an undeniable breach of the rules, many participants did not 
take the exercise seriously.  
Thus, it appears that not all ingroup wrongdoings generate the pattern of 
responding that we expected which suggests the theory needs to be much more 
specific about the nature of the offense situation. For example, individuals in dignity 
and face cultures may be more severely affected by different types of transgressions. 
The ingroup transgression in Study 3 in particular was somewhat of a “dignity” 
offense, since it was related to an allocation of resources. We did not have the power 
to further analyze the types of situations reported in Study 2, but this theory should be 
tested in the future with respect to situations that are clearly related to justice or 
reputation. We could also begin to explore other types of transgressions, such as those 






Although the nature of the transgression is certainly an important factor, it is 
also possible that participants may have distorted the situation in order to avoid 
experiencing an unpleasant emotion like guilt or shame (Baumeister & Catanese, 
2001; Kruglanski et al., 2012). In Study 2, a significant number of participants were 
unable to recall a time when a member of their sorority or fraternity member 
committed a wrongdoing. Although this may have truly been the case for some 
individuals, particularly those who were new to the organization, it is somewhat 
suspect that so many participants claimed that a member of their organization had 
never done anything wrong. Some participants said they simply couldn’t remember 
an incident. Others were quite defiant; apparently offended by the prompt’s 
suggestion that someone in their organization could have done something wrong. 
Participants boasted of their organization’s character and moral integrity and denied 
that such a wrongdoing could have taken place. Although we did not have the power 
to investigate further, we wonder whether some participants were unable to recall a 
past wrongdoing in order to avoid guilt or shame, and if this trend might have been 
more common in high-face participants.  
There was a relationship between face and this kind of distortion response in 
Study 3. Although many participants did not take the ingroup wrongdoing seriously 
in Study 3, some participants took it even less seriously than others. The trend for 
face to predict increased perceptions of fair behavior and guilt only in private suggest 
that other factors may have been at play. If participants were not taking the exercise 




Instead, it appeared that high-face participants may have been distorting the situation, 
justifying to themselves that a wrongdoing in the context laboratory exercise was not 
cause for concern.  
Our exploratory analyses in Study 2 offer additional support for this 
hypothesis. We did not find a relationship between face and image-threat appraisals 
in our main analyses. When we added severity as a moderator, however, high-face 
participants did appraise the situation to threaten their image, but only when the 
offense was perceived to be severe. Therefore, it may be possible to distort the 
situation when the implications for the offense are ambiguous (such as was the case in 
Study 3 and for many participants in Study 2) but not in stronger situations (such as 
was the case in Study 1). Future research should explore this distortion hypothesis, 
with respect to how people from face cultures will respond to ingroup wrongdoings 
when it is easy versus difficult to distort the situation, and also what kinds of 
conditions allow for distortion.  
It is also possible that people from dignity cultures gradually recognize the 
severity of situations as they become more serious (i.e. linearly), whereas people from 
face cultures may distort until a certain threshold where they can distort no more, at 
which point theorized distancing mechanisms are activated (i.e. nonlinearly). A 
dynamical tool has already been developed to study the cultural context of conflict 
escalation using progressive scenarios (Bui-Wrzosinska, Gelfand et al., 2009). We 
could adapt this tool to reflect ingroup transgressions and examine the linearity or 





Relationship With the Wrongdoer 
There are a number of situational elements that may make it more or less 
difficult to distort information. The nature of the transgression is one factor. The 
relationship with the wrongdoer is another. Because face is related not only to 
reputation but group harmony, individuals may feel “trapped” when witnessing an 
ingroup member commit a wrongdoing. When it is not possible to distance oneself 
from the wrongdoer, it may be easier to distort the situation so as to not experience 
guilt or shame.  
Our exploratory analyses in Study 3 shed some light on this possibility. We 
found that high-face participants gave a lower proportion of tokens to the victim in 
private when they were not close to their friend. In public, though, there was a trend 
for high-face participants to give a greater proportion of their tokens to the victim 
when they were less close to their friend. In public, high-face participants could 
distance themselves from a friend who was not very close and save their own face by 
giving the victim more tokens. In private, the trend is less clear, although participants 
may have wanted to avoid creating discomfort between themselves and a friend who 
they did not know so well. 
These interactions with closeness also offer insight to the important question 
of how face operates in different situations. Although the public condition certainly 
involved greater risks to one’s public reputation, it would be naïve to claim that face 
concerns should be absent in the private condition. On the contrary, the importance of 
maintaining harmony may be even more paramount in the absence of judgment from 




preserving one’s own face in front of others. As one high-face participant in the 
public condition in Study 3 explained: 
“I thought my friend took too much and violated the rule […] I wanted to 
make up for the extra part my friend took from the receiver in her round […] 
At first I wanted to give my friend 30 […] Since my decision can be seen by 
my friend, I don't want her to feel bad as I give the other receiver 55 to make 
up for the extra-taken part, I raised the amount for my friend to 50.”  
This participant’s explanation for her motivation to distribute tokens highlights the 
complexity of the face construct. Face may be associated with distancing from, 
increased commitment to, and protection of an ingroup wrongdoer, depending on the 
situation. Therefore, we should pay close attention to these subtle contextual factors 
in our theorizing about face-related behavior. 
The Constructs of Dignity and Face 
Although not new concepts, research on dignity and face is quite young in the 
field of cross-cultural psychology. Therefore, there is still much more to uncover 
about what aspects of dignity and face culture are particularly salient with respect to 
self-relevant events like ingroup transgressions. In our theorizing, we focused on the 
importance of fairness and egalitarian values in dignity cultures, and the importance 
of reputation as threat to group harmony in face cultures. However, our results (and 
also lack-thereof) cause us to consider other important aspects of these cultures that 
may not have been captured in our measures or were neglected in our hypotheses. 
As discussed, the development and particularly the validation of the Dignity 




studies was suboptimal, especially in comparison to the face scale. Therefore, the 
content validity of the items may have led to problems with the predictive validity of 
the scale. The items included in the scale are more related to freedom and 
independence from judgment of others rather than the belief that every individual has 
equal worth or the unequivocal right to be respected.  
These two aspects of dignity culture may predict quite different outcomes in 
response to ingroup wrongdoings. We would expect that endorsement of dignity 
values surrounding equal worth and egalitarian treatment would lead to appraisals 
about injustices and behavior directed toward repairing an ingroup wrongdoing. 
However, endorsement of dignity values surrounding freedom and independence 
from judgment might lead individuals to feel detached or indifferent in response to an 
ingroup transgression. In the most extreme case, the belief that individuals deserve an 
equal opportunity to succeed can translate into the belief that individuals who find 
themselves in a state of misfortune are on their own to get themselves out of trouble. 
Both our measures and our hypotheses do not distinguish between these dignity-
related values. 
With respect to face cultures, we have already alluded to some of the 
unforeseen complexities involving face culture that were not addressed in our 
hypotheses or measures. Although the internal consistency of the face scale was 
acceptable, our dependent variables may not have been operationalized appropriately 
to capture the range of responses induced by an ingroup transgression in face cultures. 
We were looking for conscious recognition of threats to one’s image and clear 




that because that the purpose of distancing and withdrawing is to save face and avoid 
disrupting harmony, it must be done in a way that is subtle, perhaps even too subtle to 
be picked up by our measures. We also did not consider that distortion might be 
another mechanism for avoiding the situation. If this is indeed the case, we might not 
be able to find support for our hypotheses with such explicit measures of appraisals 
and behavioral intentions.  
Moreover, in our theorizing about the importance of public situations, we 
neglected to consider whether a public situation 1) makes salient concerns about 
one’s reputation held by the public at large (as hypothesized) or 2) makes salient 
concerns about one’s reputation held solely by one’s ingroup, which would also be 
applicable in “private” situations. Because face cultures are deeply committed to 
maintaining intragroup harmony, the witness of an ingroup offense may be more 
concerned about the wrongdoer’s perception that he or she is withdrawing from the 
group rather than the public’s perception that he or she is associated with the group. 
Thus, we might actually find that individuals from face cultures will neither advance 
nor retreat, but will rather remain “paralyzed” in the desire to avoid disrupting 
intragroup harmony. It would be useful to address this distinction of ingroup-
outgroup public audience in future work by manipulating who the public is, such as 





Methodological Limitations and Future Directions 
Sampling 
As discussed, our American sample presented certain challenges in assessing 
the dignity and face constructs. Future studies should sample individuals who are 
actually immersed in a culture of face. To this point, we are working on a replication 
of Study 2, having just collected data at a university in Japan. We should also 
replicate this work in non-student samples, as college students are limited in the types 
of ingroup transgressions with which they can relate. We could test our theory in 
another setting such as a workplace or other organization, where individuals may bear 
witness to ingroup wrongdoings with a greater degree of frequency. 
Stimuli and Measures 
In our discussion of theoretical expansion, we addressed some parts of our 
methodology that made it difficult to test our theory as intended. In the future, we 
need to develop measures of appraisals, emotions and behavior that we can use in the 
lab without evoking social desirability concerns that may result in ceiling effects 
(e.g., desire to apologize) or motivated distortion (e.g., indicating one does not feel 
guilt to avoid feeling guilt). This will require devising creative, implicit measures that 
are more sensitive to the subtleties of face-driven behavior. For instance, we could 
use facial recognition or eye-tracking software to analyze participants’ reactions to 
the news of a friend’s wrongdoing rather than rely on self-report measures of guilt 




 We also need to generate stronger situations for the lab that do not allow for 
distortion. The community interactions exercise used in Study 3 was a brand new 
paradigm and can be modified in the future to improve external validity. For instance, 
“tokens” could be exchanged for another more meaningful resource, such as bonus 
study payment. Rather than have participants respond by giving their own tokens, 
which would be a conflict of self-interest, they could respond by helping or 
apologizing in an unrelated task. We could also improve the base rate of our 
messages measure by having participants choose from pre-written messages to send 
at the end of the exercise. 
Alternatively, we could contrive a situation where it appears the ingroup 
friend has committed a more egregious offense, such as cheating, stealing or hurting 
another participant’s feelings. In order to create a stronger situation, we could also 
use a minimal groups paradigm such that a confederate group member blatantly 
commits one of the aforementioned offenses. Conducting cross-cultural focus groups 
could help us identify situations that are considered equally atrocious in dignity and 
face cultures so that we can pilot different types of offenses in the lab.  
Conclusion 
Earlier, we recalled the incident when the President of Toyota was forced to 
respond to a highly public company failure. Although this was an extreme case, it is 
only one example of how misunderstanding can arise due to cross-cultural differences 
in concerns associated with ingroup wrongdoings. This research not only revealed 
that high-face individuals are indeed sometimes driven by image concerns and shame 




other unexpected patterns of responding that can emerge in face cultures. This work 
contributes to both the guilt and shame and cross-cultural literatures. We have 
provided a theoretical expansion to the existing work on group-based guilt and 
shame, unearthing new possibilities for how individuals can respond to self-relevant 
offenses. We have also examined a relatively understudied cultural construct and 
explored new domains in which it predicts intergroup behavior. Finally, this research 
has afforded a better understanding of what motivates behavior in response to ingroup 
transgressions across cultures, which has the practical potential to help attenuate 









Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 1 Withdrawal Intentions From Face, Dignity and Condition 
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face .02 .19 .01 
 
.15 .20 .08 
Dignity -.28 .23 -.13 
 
-.30 .23 -.14 
Condition -.08 .12 -.07 
 
-.09 .12 -.08 
Condition x Face 
    
.50* .20 .26 
Condition x Dignity 
    
-.13 .23 -.06 
        R2 .02 
   
.09 
  R2adj -.02 
   
.04 
  R2Change .02 
   
.07* 
  Overall F .53 
   
1.74 
  df 95       93     
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 1 Reparative Intentions From Face, Dignity and Condition 
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face .16 .14 .12 
 
.14 .14 .11 
Dignity -.03 .16 -.02 
 
-.07 .16 -.05 
Condition -.06 .09 -.07 
 
-.06 .09 -.08 
Condition x Face 
    
.05 .14 .04 
Condition x Dignity 
    
.34* .16 .22 
        R2 .02 
   
.06 
  R2adj -.01 
   
.01 
  R2Change .02 
   
.05 
  Overall F .58 
   
1.27 
  df 95       93     
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 







Moderated Mediation for Distancing Behavioral Intentions 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Image Appraisals     
 Face .56 .13 4.16** 
 Condition .32 .08 3.94** 
 Condition x Face .28 .13 2.06* 
 Shame      
 Face .51 .15 3.45** 
 Condition .01 .09 .06 
 Condition x Face .36 .15 2.46* 
Dependent Model     
 Image Appraisals .29 .13 2.16* 
 Shame .40 .12 3.31** 
 Face -.18 .16 -1.11 
 Condition -.29 .10 -2.92** 
 Condition x Face .06 .15 .36 
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 







Moderated Mediation for Withdrawal Behavioral Intentions 
  B SE t 
Mediator Model     
 Image Appraisals     
 Face .56 .13 4.16** 
 Condition .32 .08 3.94** 
 Condition x Face .28 .13 2.06* 
 Shame      
 Face .51 .15 3.45** 
 Condition .01 .09 .06 
 Condition x Face .36 .15 2.46* 
Dependent Model     
 Image Appraisals .24 .14 1.66† 
 Shame .62 .13 4.74** 
 Face -.29 .18 -1.60 
 Condition -.13 .11 -1.21 
 Condition x Face .19 .17 1.16 
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 






Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations among the variables in Study 2 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Face  3.35 .57 .70 
        
 
2. Dignity  4.01 .47 .04 .50 
       
 
3. Severity 2.40 .98 -.19 .13 
       
 
4. Image 
appraisals 3.39 1.20 -.02 -.21 .27* .82 
     
 
5. Justice 
appraisals 3.51 1.11 -.06 .03 .36** .06 .86 
    
 
6. Shame 2.20 1.08 .05 -.03 .23* .52** .23* .92 
   
 
7. Guilt 1.88 .95 .04 .00 .03 .18 .13 .50** .79 
  
 
8. Distance 2.72 1.34 -.11 -.13 .41** .51** .34** .56** .19 .92 
 
 
9. Withdraw 2.53 1.32 -.05 -.21 .27* .49** .22* .58** .36** .87** .76  
10. Repair 3.49 1.14 .02 .16 .35** .27* .43** .48** .32** .53** .50** .85 
Note: N = 79                        
Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients in italics on the diagonal 
 
* p < .05  ** p < .01 








Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 2 Image-Threat Appraisals From Face, Dignity and Public/Private 
Context 
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face -.07 .22 -.03 
 
-.07 .22 -.03 
Dignity -.41 .27 -.16 
 
-.49† .28 -.19 
Public/Private .43** .13 .36 
 
.43** .13 .36 
Public/Private x Face 
    
.29 .22 .14 
Public/Private x Dignity 
    
.38 .28 .15 
        R2 .17 
   
.22 
  R2adj .14 
   
.16 
  R2Change .17** 
   
.04 
  Overall F 5.14** 
   
3.96** 
  df 74       72     
Note: Public/Private is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 2 Justice Appraisals From Face, Dignity and Public/Private 
Context 
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face -.12 .23 -.06 
 
-.10 .23 -.05 
Dignity .09 .28 .04 
 
.05 .28 .02 
Public/Private .05 .13 .05 
 
.05 .13 .04 
Public/Private x Face 
    
-.35 .23 -.18 
Public/Private x Dignity 
    
.11 .28 .05 
        R2 .01 
   
.04 
  R2adj -.03 
   
-.03 
  R2Change .01 
   
.03 
  Overall F .16 
   
.58 
  df 74       72     
Note: Public/Private is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 2 Shame From Face, Dignity and Public/Private Context 
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face .08 .21 .04 
 
.08 .21 .04 
Dignity .03 .25 .01 
 
.04 .26 .02 
Public/Private .37** .12 .34 
 
.37** .12 .34 
Public/Private x Face 
    
.06 .21 .03 
Public/Private x Dignity 
    
-.03 .26 -.01 
        R2 .12 
   
.12 
  R2adj .08 
   
.06 
  R2Change .12* 
   
.00 
  Overall F 3.35* 
   
1.98† 
  df 75       73     
Note: Public/Private is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 2 Guilt From Face, Dignity and Public/Private Context 
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face .06 .19 .04 
 
.07 .20 .04 
Dignity .01 .24 .00 
 
-.01 .24 .00 
Public/Private .01 .11 .01 
 
.00 .11 .00 
Public/Private x Face 
    
-.21 .20 -.12 
Public/Private x Dignity 
    
.03 .24 .01 
        R2 .00 
   
.02 
  R2adj -.04 
   
-.05 
  R2Change .00 
   
.02 
  Overall F .03 
   
.24 
  df 75       73     
Note: Public/Private is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 2 Distancing Intentions From Face, Dignity and Public/Private 
Context  
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face -.26 .27 -.11 
 
-.26 .27 -.11 
Dignity -.33 .33 -.12 
 
-.40 .34 -.14 
Public/Private .14 .15 .11 
 
.14 .15 .10 
Public/Private x Face 
    
.10 .27 .04 
Public/Private x Dignity 
    
.33 .34 .11 
        R2 .04 
   
.06 
  R2adj .00 
   
-.01 
  R2Change .04 
   
.02 
  Overall F 1.07 
   
.86 
  df 75       73     
Note: Public/Private is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 2 Withdrawal Intentions From Face, Dignity and Public/Private 
Context  
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face -.10 .26 -.04 
 
-.09 .26 -.04 
Dignity -.58† .32 -.21 
 
-.70* .33 -.25 
Public/Private .04 .15 .03 
 
.03 .15 .02 
Public/Private x Face 
    
.19 .26 .08 
Public/Private x Dignity 
    
.53 .33 .19 
        R2 .05 
   
.09 
  R2adj .01 
   
.03 
  R2Change .05 
   
.04 
  Overall F 1.24 
   
1.42 
  df 75       73     
Note: Public/Private is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 2 Reparative Intentions From Face, Dignity and Public/Private 
Context  
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face .03 .23 .02 
 
.04 .23 .02 
Dignity .42 .28 .17 
 
.39 .29 .16 
Public/Private .08 .13 .07 
 
.08 .13 .07 
Public/Private x Face 
    
.02 .23 .01 
Public/Private x Dignity 
    
.12 .29 .05 
        R2 .03 
   
.03 
  R2adj -.01 
   
-.03 
  R2Change .03 
   
.00 
  Overall F .81 
   
.51 
  df 75       73     
Note: Public/Private is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 2 Image Appraisals From Face, Public/Private Context and 
Severity 
  Step 1   Step 2   Step 3 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face -.05 .23 -.02 
 
-.07 .23 -.03 
 
-.13 .23 -.06 
Public/Private .41** .14 .34 
 
.43** .14 .36 
 
.49** .14 .41 
Severity .21 .14 .17 
 
.20 .15 .16 
 
.19 .14 .15 
Public/Private x Face 
    
.40 .23 .19 
 
.37 .23 .17 
Face x Severity 
    
.09 .31 .03 
 
.13 .31 .05 
Public/Private x Severity 
    
.10 .14 .08 
 
.04 .14 .03 
Face x Public/Private x Severity 
       
.60† .31 .14 
            R2 .18 
   
.22 
   
.26 
  R2adj .15 
   
.15 
   
.19 
  R2Change .18** 
   
.04 
   
.04† 
  Overall F 5.34** 
   
3.26** 
   
3.44** 
  df 72       69       68     
Note: Public/Private is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
† p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 
















Everyone behaved fairly during the exercise. -.91 -.02 .03 .10 
There was an injustice between two or more of the players during 
the exercise. .65 .28 .04 .10 
There was a breach of fairness during the exercise .62 -.21 -.04 .13 
The participants all received what they deserved. -.56 -.14 .16 .24 
As a whole, the other participants were generous. -.44 .09 -.11 -.10 
Compensating for other participants’ actions was none of my 
business. .20 -.58 .04 -.11 
I didn't care whether people were treated fairly during the exercise. .06 -.54 .20 .01 
I felt concerned for one or more of the participants during the 
exercise. .22 .49 .01 .14 
If one participant behaved unfairly during their turn, I could 
reverse the damage during my own turn. .03 .31 .06 .00 
Other people were aware of my association with my friend. 
(During the friend’s turn) -.02 .03 -.91 .09 
Other people were aware of my association with my friend. 
(During the participant’s turn) .05 -.06 -.84 .05 
My image/reputation was at stake. (During the friend’s turn) -.01 .14 .01 .80 
My image/reputation was at stake. (During the participant’s turn) .03 .03 -.15 .60 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring  
















I wanted to apologize on behalf of my friend. .92 -.12 .09 -.05 
I wanted my friend to apologize. .70 -.07 -.19 -.08 
I wanted to reach out toward any participant(s) in the game who 
were treated unfairly. 
.58 .16 .05 .06 
I wanted to exit the exercise early. -.02 -.77 -.03 .40 
I wanted the exercise to last longer. .03 .56 -.01 .12 
I didn't want to take a turn. .02 -.47 .02 -.10 
I wanted to be associated with my friend. .10 -.02 .93 .13 
I wanted to be unassociated with my friend. .10 .03 -.86 .17 
I wanted my friend to experience consequences for what he/she 
did. 
.31 .03 -.28 .49 
I wanted my friend to receive positive recognition for what he/she 
did.* 
-.13 .12 .31 .49 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring  
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 









Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations Among the Variables in Study 3 
 
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Face (Family 3.69 .69 .80               
2. Dignity (Family) 3.57 .65 -.05 .65              
3. Face (Individual) 3.28 .58 .60** -.02 .70             
4. Dignity 
(Individual) 
3.26 .49 .01 .31** -.06 .50            
5. IOS 4.47 1.24 .19 .02 .06 .03            
6. Image appraisal 2.00 1.10 .16 -.14 .05 -.15 -.07           
7. Justice appraisals 3.47 .91 -.18 -.06 -.17 -.10 -.17 .09 .77         
8. Guilt/Shame 1.47 .55 .06 -.09 .01 -.05 -.08 .37** .12 .90        
9. Distance 2.58 .99 -.14 -.05 -.42** -.10 -.15 .12 .25* .20* .86       
10. Withdraw 2.72 1.07 -.08 -.10 -.05 .04 -.10 -.17 .00 -.08 .03 .61      
11. Punish 2.70 1.29 .01 -.09 .00 -.10 .12 .20* .14 .13 .37** -.01      
12. Repair 3.09 1.07 .15 .00 .02 .06 -.04 .30** .36** .39** .35** -.01 .45** .76    
13. Victim 
Reparations (tokens) 
32.13 14.32 .08 .03 .00 .08 -.01 .03 -.19 -.03 .01 -.16 .26* .21*    
14. Friend distance 
(tokens) 










.51 .11 .11 .01 -.08 .07 -.20 .00 -.01 -.03 .27** -.23* .25* .29** .55** -.47** .95** 
Note: N = 98 for 1-11, N = 95 for 12-15                                 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients are in italics on the diagonal 








Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Victim Reparations (in Tokens) From Face, Dignity and 
Condition 
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face 1.50 2.23 .07 
 
1.42 2.25 .07 
Dignity .66 2.36 .03 
 
.43 2.38 .02 
Condition .26 1.54 .02 
 
.29 1.55 .02 
Condition x Face 
    
2.41 2.25 .11 
Condition x Dignity 
    
.63 2.38 .03 
        R2 .01 
   
.02 
  R2adj -.03 
   
-.04 
  R2Change .01 
   
.01 
  Overall F .21 
   
.37 
  df 91       89     
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Ingroup Distancing (in Tokens) From Face, Dignity and 
Condition 
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face .09 2.16 .00 
 
.20 2.18 .01 
Dignity -1.22 2.28 -.06 
 
-1.14 2.31 -.05 
Condition -1.01 1.49 -.07 
 
-1.02 1.50 -.07 
Condition x Face 
    
-.06 2.18 .00 
Condition x Dignity 
    
-1.56 2.31 -.07 
        R2 .01 
   
.01 
  R2adj -.03 
   
-.04 
  R2Change .01 
   
.01 
  Overall F .24 
   
.24 
  df 91       89     
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 







Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Ingroup Punishment (Absolute Difference in Tokens) From 
Face, Dignity and Condition 
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face 1.41 2.34 .07 
 
1.21 2.35 .06 
Dignity 1.88 2.48 .08 
 
1.57 2.49 .07 
Condition 1.26 1.62 .08 
 
1.32 1.62 .09 
Condition x Face 
    
2.47 2.35 .11 
Condition x Dignity 
    
2.19 2.49 .09 
        R2 .02 
   
.04 
  R2adj -.01 
   
-.02 
  R2Change .02 
   
.02 
  Overall F .60 
   
.73 
  df 91       89     
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Ingroup Punishment (Proportion of Victim Tokens) From Face, 
Dignity and Condition  
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face .02 .02 .10 
 
.01 .02 .09 
Dignity .00 .02 .01 
 
.00 .02 .00 
Condition .01 .01 .05 
 
.01 .01 .05 
Condition x Face 
    
.01 .02 .07 
Condition x Dignity 
    
.01 .02 .09 
        R2 .01 
   
.03 
  R2adj -.02 
   
-.03 
  R2Change .01 
   
.01 
  Overall F .42 
   
.46 
  df 91       89     
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 




 Table 30 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Image Appraisal From Face, Dignity and Condition 
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face .23 .17 .14 
 
.23 .17 .14 
Dignity -.22 .17 -.13 
 
-.23 .17 -.13 
Condition .06 .11 .06 
 
.06 .12 .06 
Condition x Face 
    
.09 .17 .06 
Condition x Dignity 
    
.03 .17 .02 
        R2 .05 
   
.05 
  R2adj .02 
   
.00 
  R2Change .05 
   
.00 
  Overall F 1.53 
   
.96 
  df 94       92     
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Justice Appraisals From Face, Dignity and Condition 
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face -.28* .14 -.21 
 
-.29* .13 -.22 
Dignity -.09 .14 -.07 
 
-.13 .14 -.10 
Condition .09 .10 .10 
 
.09 .09 .10 
Condition x Face 
    
-.04 .13 -.03 
Condition x Dignity 
    
.37** .14 .27 
        R2 .05 
   
.12 
  R2adj .02 
   
.07 
  R2Change .05 
   
.07* 
  Overall F 1.57 
   
2.47* 
  df 93       91     
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Guilt and Shame From Face, Dignity and Condition 
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face .04 .09 .05 
 
.04 .08 .05 
Dignity -.07 .09 -.09 
 
-.07 .09 -.08 
Condition .02 .06 .04 
 
.02 .06 .04 
Condition x Face 
    
-.16† .08 -.20 
Condition x Dignity 
    
.02 .09 .02 
        R2 .01 
   
.05 
  R2adj -.02 
   
.00 
  R2Change .01 
   
.04 
  Overall F .42 
   
1.04 
  df 94       92     
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Distancing Intentions From Face, Dignity and Condition 
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face -.21 .15 -.15 
 
-.22 .15 -.15 
Dignity -.08 .16 -.05 
 
-.12 .15 -.08 
Condition .00 .10 .00 
 
.00 .10 .00 
Condition x Face 
    
-.10 .15 -.07 
Condition x Dignity 
    
.36* .15 .24 
        R2 .02 
   
.08 
  R2adj -.01 
   
.03 
  R2Change .02 
   
.06† 
  Overall F .74 
   
1.68 
  df 94       92     
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Withdrawal Intentions From Face, Dignity and Condition 
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face -.12 .16 -.07 
 
-.12 .15 -.08 
Dignity -.17 .17 -.10 
 
-.20 .16 -.12 
Condition -.06 .11 -.05 
 
-.06 .11 -.06 
Condition x Face 
    
-.47** .15 -.29 
Condition x Dignity 
    
.38* .16 .23 
        R2 .02 
   
.16 
  R2adj -.01 
   
.12 
  R2Change .02 
   
.14** 
  Overall F .62 
   
3.59** 
  df 94       92     
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Ingroup Punishment Intentions From Face, Dignity and 
Condition 
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face .02 .20 .01 
 
.02 .20 .01 
Dignity -.18 .20 -.09 
 
-.20 .21 -.10 
Condition -.04 .14 -.03 
 
-.03 .14 -.03 
Condition x Face 
    
.11 .20 .06 
Condition x Dignity 
    
.17 .21 .09 
        R2 .01 
   
.02 
  R2adj -.02 
   
-.04 
  R2Change .01 
   
.01 
  Overall F .27 
   
.35 
  df 94       92     
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Reparative Intentions From Face, Dignity and Condition 
  Step 1   Step 2 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face .19 .16 .12 
 
.19 .16 .12 
Dignity .01 .17 .01 
 
.00 .17 .00 
Condition .12 .11 .11 
 
.12 .11 .11 
Condition x Face 
    
-.22 .16 -.14 
Condition x Dignity 
    
.13 .17 .08 
        R2 .03 
   
.06 
  R2adj .00 
   
.01 
  R2Change .03 
   
.03 
  Overall F 1.08 
   
1.15 
  df 94       92     
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
     † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Friend Distancing (in Tokens) From Face, Condition and IOS 
  Step 1   Step 2   Step 3 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face -.47 2.12 -.02 
 
.62 2.16 .03 
 
1.17 2.21 .06 
Condition -1.33 1.47 -.10 
 
-1.57 1.46 -.12 
 
-1.78 1.47 -.13 
IOS -2.31* 1.16 -.21 
 
-3.13* 1.22 -.28 
 
-3.44* 1.25 -.31 
Condition x Face 
    
-1.51 2.17 -.07 
 
-2.04 2.21 -.10 
Face x IOS 
    
-3.56* 1.73 -.25 
 
-3.28† 1.74 -.23 
Condition x IOS 
    
.33 1.21 .03 
 
.72 1.25 .07 
Face x Condition x IOS 
        
2.05 1.74 .14 
            R2 .05 
   
.10 
   
.11 
  R2adj .04 
   
.04 
   
.04 
  R2Change .05 
   
.05 
   
.02 
  Overall F 1.61 
   
1.55 
   
1.53 
  df 87       84       83     
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
† p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Ingroup Punishment (Absolute Difference in Tokens) From 
Face, Condition and IOS 
  Step 1   Step 2   Step 3 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face 1.74 2.43 .08 
 
.80 2.49 .04 
 
-.30 2.50 -.01 
Condition 1.01 1.68 .07 
 
1.26 1.68 .08 
 
1.70 1.66 .11 
IOS -.04 1.34 .00 
 
.67 1.41 .05 
 
1.31 1.41 .11 
Condition x Face 
    
3.40 2.49 .15 
 
4.46† 2.50 .20 
Face x IOS 
    
3.12 1.99 .19 
 
2.58 1.97 .16 
Condition x IOS 
    
-.09 1.39 -.01 
 
-.88 1.41 -.07 
Face x Condition x IOS 
        
-4.09* 1.97 .14 
            R2 .01 
   
.06 
   
.10 
  R2adj -.01 
   
-.01 
   
.03 
  R2Change .01 
   
.04 
   
.05* 
  Overall F .39 
   
.81 
   
1.34 
  df 87       84       83     
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
† p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Ingroup Punishment (Proportion of Tokens) From Face, 
Condition and IOS 
  Step 1   Step 2   Step 3 
Predictor B SE B !   B SE B !   B SE B ! 
Face .02 .02 .11 
 
.01 .02 .08 
 
.00 .02 .03 
Condition .00 .01 .03 
 
.01 .01 .04 
 
.01 .01 .07 
IOS .00 .01 -.02 
 
.00 .01 .03 
 
.01 .01 .08 
Condition x Face 
    
.02 .02 .10 
 
.02 .02 .15 
Face x IOS 
    
.02 .01 .17 
 
.02 .01 .13 
Condition x IOS 
    
.00 .01 -.03 
 
-.01 .01 -.09 
Face x Condition x IOS 
        
-.03† .01 .14 
            R2 .02 
   
.04 
   
.08 
  R2adj -.03 
   
-.03 
   
.00 
  R2Change .02 
   
.03 
   
.04† 
  Overall F .45 
   
.59 
   
1.05 
  df 87       84       83     
Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public 
† p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01 






































































Figure 6. Three-way interaction of face, public/private context and severity on appraisals 







Figure 7. Three-way interaction of face, public/private context and severity on appraisals 














































Figure 12. Three-way interaction of face, condition and IOS on ingroup punishment in 






Figure 13. Three-way interaction of face, condition and IOS on ingroup punishment in 








Figure 14. Three-way interaction of face, condition and IOS on ingroup punishment in 






Figure 15. Three-way interaction of face, condition and IOS on ingroup punishment in 





Appendix A: Study 1 Scenarios 
 





Now, you will read some hypothetical scenarios involving you and your friend. Please 
read each story carefully. You will then be asked to answer some questions about these 
scenarios.  Please answer the questions as if the scenario happened exactly as it was 
described, even if you find it difficult to imagine.  
 
Scenario 1, private condition: 
Imagine that [FRIEND’S NAME] picked you up from your apartment complex. When 
backing out of a parking space, [FRIEND’S NAME] hit a parked car in your lot and left 
noticeable damage. [FRIEND’S NAME] said “Oops!” and continued to drive out of the 
parking lot without leaving a note on the car that was hit. The parking lot was empty 
when this happened. 
 
Scenario 1, public condition: 
Imagine that [FRIEND’S NAME] picked you up from your apartment complex. When 
backing out of a parking space, [FRIEND’S NAME] hit a parked car in your lot and left 
noticeable damage. [FRIEND’S NAME]  said “Oops!” and continued to drive out of the 
parking lot without leaving a note on the car that was hit. There were several other people 
in the parking lot who saw this happen. 
 
Scenario 2, private condition: 
Imagine that you live in a dorm on campus with your friend [FRIEND’S NAME]. There 
is a student on another hall who is somewhat quiet and withdrawn. You hear [FRIEND’S 
NAME] make some nasty, hurtful comments about this student that are completely 
unfounded. Eventually, these rumors start to spread.  When the student finally hears the 
rumors, most people don’t remember who actually started them. 
 
Scenario 2, public condition: 
Imagine that you live in a dorm on campus with your friend [FRIEND’S NAME] . There 
is a student on another hall who is somewhat quiet and withdrawn. You hear [FRIEND’S 
NAME] make some nasty, hurtful comments about this student that are completely 
unfounded. Eventually, these rumors start to spread. When the student finally hears the 




Appendix B: Dignity and Face Scale 
 
In the following you will be asked your opinion about what [you think/your parents, 
while you were growing up thought] about various issues.  Your responses are 
completely anonymous. Remember, these questions ask about what [you think/your 
parents, while you were growing up, thought]. To what extent [do you/did your parents, 
when you were growing up] believe... 
 1 = Not at all 2 
3 = 
Somewhat 4 








not based on 
what others 
think 






!  !  !  !  !  
 -How much 
a person 
respects 






!  !  !  !  !  
 -People 
should stand 
up for what 
they believe 
in even when 
others 
disagree 




 1 = Not at all 2 
3 = 
Somewhat 4 













!  !  !  !  !  




















at all costs 




careful not to 
embarrass 
other people 










 1 = Not at all 2 
3 = 
Somewhat 4 












Appendix C: Study 1-2 Appraisal Questionnaire 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.  








happened was a 
violation of 
fairness. 
!  !  !  !  !  !  
2. What 
happened was a 
violation of 
personal rights. 
!  !  !  !  !  !  
3. What 
happened was an 
issue of injustice. 
!  !  !  !  !  !  




!  !  !  !  !  !  
5. The victim(s) 
did not deserve 
what happened 
to them. 
!  !  !  !  !  !  
6. It was 
important for the 
injustice between 
the wrongdoer 
and the victim(s) 
to be resolved. 






!  !  !  !  !  !  
8. What 
happened was a 
threat to my 
group’s 
image/reputation. 











9. This event 
caused me to 
lose face. 
!  !  !  !  !  !  
10. I was being 
evaluated by 
other people. 
!  !  !  !  !  !  
11. Other people 
were aware of 
my association 
with the person 
who caused the 
event. 
!  !  !  !  !  !  
12. It was 












Appendix D: Studies 1-2 Emotions Questionnaire 
To what extent [did/would] you feel…  
 1= Not at all 2 
3 = 
Somewhat 4 
5 = Very 
much 
1. Guilty !  !  !  !  !  
2. Remorseful !  !  !  !  !  
3. Regretful !  !  !  !  !  
4. Ashamed !  !  !  !  !  
5. Disgraced !  !  !  !  !  
6. Humiliated !  !  !  !  !  
7. Embarrassed !  !  !  !  !  







Appendix E: Studies 1-2 Behavioral Intentions Questionnaire8 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
Remember, these statements refer to AFTER the event has already taken place. 







1. I would 








!  !  !  !  !  !  





!  !  !  !  !  !  








!  !  !  !  !  !  
4. I would 
want to hide. !  !  !  !  !  !  
5. I would 





for what they 
did. 
!  !  !  !  !  !  
                                                
















event to go 
away. 
!  !  !  !  !  !  





make it better 
for the 
victim(s). 
!  !  !  !  !  !  
8. I would 
want to reach 
out toward 
the victim(s). 
!  !  !  !  !  !  





!  !  !  !  !  !  






!  !  !  !  !  !  






!  !  !  !  !  !  










Appendix F: Studies 1-2 Post-Scenario/Recall Questions 
How severe was this incident? 
! 1= Very low severity 
! 2 = Low severity 
! 3 = Moderate severity 
! 4 = High severity 
! 5 = Very high severity 
 




How many people seemed to observe this incident? (Note: the numbers below are part of 
a rating scale and do not represent number of people) 
! 1 = None at all 
! 2 
! 3 = A few 
! 4 
! 5 = Many 
 
How easy would it be for other people to find out about what happened? 
! Very Difficult 
! Somewhat Difficult 
! Somewhat Easy 







Appendix G: Inclusion of Other in Self Scale 
Instructions: Please circle the picture that best describes your 







Appendix H: Demographics Questionnaire 
How old are you? ________ 
 




What is your major? ______________________________ 
 
 




! African American 
! Other 
 
Please specify by country: ______________________________ 
 




If you were not born in the US, how many years have you lived here? ________ 
 














! Upper upper--(e.g., rich, influential, highly educated) 
! Lower upper--(professionals such as physicians, lawyers; owner of a major business) 
! Upper middle--(e.g., professionals, such as teachers, social workers; owner of a good 
business; owner of a large farm) 
! Lower middle--(e.g. clerical, small entrepreneurs; farmer) 
! Upper lower--(e.g., skilled worker, small farmer) 
! Lower lower--(e.g., unskilled, unemployed) 




Appendix I: Study 2 Recall Prompt 
Which sorority/fraternity do you belong to? _____________________________ 
 
A lot of people occasionally witness or hear about times when members of their own 
groups do something that's wrong. 
 
For the next 5 minutes, please write about a time when you witnessed (or heard about) a 
member of [SORORITY/FRATERNITY NAME] do something that somehow harmed or 
negatively affected others who did not belong to your group. Describe what happened. 























Appendix J: Screen Shots from the Community Interactions Exercise in Study 3 




















































Appendix K: Study 3 Appraisals Questionnaire 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below, 
based on when [YOUR FRIEND was/YOU were] taking a turn. 







Other people were 
aware of my 
association with 
my friend. 
!  !  !  !  !  !  
My 
image/reputation 
was at stake. 
!  !  !  !  !  !  
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements 
according to the scale below, based on the exercise as a whole. 











!  !  !  !  !  !  











!  !  !  !  !  !  
There was an 
injustice 
between two 
or more of the 
players during 
the exercise. 


















!  !  !  !  !  !  






















none of my 
business. 
!  !  !  !  !  !  












Appendix L: Study 3 Emotions Questionnaire 
How did you feel when [YOUR FRIEND was/YOU were] taking a turn as trader? Please 
indicate your answer using the scale provided. 
 1 = Not at all 2 
3 = 
Somewhat 4 
5 = Very 
much 
Active !  !  !  !  !  
Guilty !  !  !  !  !  
Proud !  !  !  !  !  
Blameworthy !  !  !  !  !  
Ashamed !  !  !  !  !  
Attentive !  !  !  !  !  
Dissatisfied 
with self !  !  !  !  !  
Determined !  !  !  !  !  
Embarrassed !  !  !  !  !  
Delighted !  !  !  !  !  
Regretful !  !  !  !  !  
Surprised !  !  !  !  !  
Remorseful !  !  !  !  !  
Observed !  !  !  !  !  
In control !  !  !  !  !  







Appendix M: Study 3 Behavioral Intentions Questionnaire 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements 
according to the scale below, based on the exercise as a whole 











!  !  !  !  !  !  





!  !  !  !  !  !  








!  !  !  !  !  !  






!  !  !  !  !  !  
I wanted to 
apologize on 
behalf of my 
friend. 
!  !  !  !  !  !  
I wanted my 
friend to 
apologize. 
!  !  !  !  !  !  




!  !  !  !  !  !  
I wanted the 
exercise to 
last longer. 











I didn't want 





Appendix N: Study 3 Post-Exercise Survey 
Please answer some questions about your experience participating in the exercise. 
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